Source: mass email
tsasmanager posted: "by Jesse MacLean, M.A. Candidate in the Global Governance program at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Ontario. When someone kills several people and leaves behind a manifesto which states their actions are driven by a gr"
New post on THE CANADIAN NETWORK FOR RESEARCH ON TERRORISM, SECURITY, AND SOCIETY
Can Violence Driven by Extremist Misogyny Constitute 'Lone Wolf Terrorism?'
by tsasmanagerby Jesse MacLean, M.A. Candidate in the Global Governance program at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Ontario.When someone kills several people and leaves behind a manifesto which states their actions are driven by a grievance against society, is it a political act of terrorism or an apolitical 'tragedy'? The answer to this question may help determine how acts of violence like the May 23rd killings in Isla Vista are viewed by society and the authorities: as an exceptional crime, or as a terrorist attack driven by a form of extremist ideology as real as any white supremacist or other worldview.One of the most challenging aspects of studying and discussing terrorism is that there is no universal agreement on a definition. Depending on the perspective and agenda of whoever applies the 'terrorist' label, a terrorist can be anything from a religious fanatic to a mentally unstable bomber, an invading soldier or a 'freedom fighter.'The category of 'lone wolf terrorism' blurs these lines further. In a 'lone wolf' attack, a single person acts separately from any militant organization as they strive to achieve political goals through public acts of mass violence. This violence is often though not always directed against civilian targets. Commonly-given examples of 'lone wolves' include the July 2011 bomb and gun attacks in Norway where 77 people were killed by a right-wing extremist, as well as the 'Unabomber' Ted Kaczynski, who spent decades sending mail bombs in the name of combating modern technology. Such attackers often make explicit political statements backed by violence. However, they may also be suffering from mental health challenges or be driven by personal interests. Because of this, it can be difficult to determine where a political cause ends and where a medical need for therapy and treatment begins.Distinguishing between political actors attempting to advance an agenda and apolitical spree killers is crucial for determining whether the 'terrorist' label applies to a particular act of violence. This determination is important, as it is generally accepted that a terrorist threatens society in a way that a bank robber does not. Unlike a materially-motivated criminal, the terrorist directs indiscriminate violence against civilians in service to ideals which are often incompatible with the basic values of a free and just society.If all this is accepted, what does it mean for the crime perpetrated in Isla Vista on May 23? Elliot Rodgers killed six people and himself, leaving behind statements indicating his actions were driven by a form of extremist misogyny that viewed his sexual frustration as a legitimate reason to kill. While the perpetrator was clearly grappling with mental health challenges, it is difficult to read his statements about a 'War on Women' which included fantasies about exterminating women in concentration camps without perceiving an ideological tinge to this violence. According to an editorial published earlier this month in the Globe and Mail, this was indeed a terrorist act, little different from any other political extremist lashing out at a group blamed for the perpetrator's perceived oppression.The Criminal Code of Canada defines terrorism as a criminal act committed "in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause" with the intention of intimidating the public "…with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act." If one recognizes Rodgers' worldview as an ideology and also accepts that the Isla Vista shootings were for the purpose of 'compelling a person' (i.e., women) to 'do or to refrain from doing any act' (in this case, sexually gratifying the perpetrator), then the Globe's argument that his actions constituted terrorism is supportable according to the laws of Canada. The key question is whether online hatred against women can be considered an 'ideology' for the purposes of the terrorist label.Violence in service to extreme aspirations such as a resurrected Nazi regime or jihadist theocracy is commonly accepted as political violence, as 'terrorism.' If these agendas can be accepted as 'legitimate' ideologies, than perhaps so can terrorism in service to 'extremist misogyny.' The Isla Vista killings are not the first time someone has publicly lashed out against women, and unfortunately they are unlikely to be the last. Every year Canadians remember the 1989 Ecole Polytechnique massacre, commemorating the murder of fourteen women by a man whose suicide note explicitly stated his crime was a political act in opposition to feminism. The perpetrator of a 2009 murder-suicide in Pennsylvania also targeted women, killing three of them at a fitness club. His statements, like those of Elliot Rodgers, revolved around sexual frustration and hatred of women.This ideology may not have standing terrorist organizations fighting for it – there is no misogynist equivalent to Al-Qaeda – but there is a community with its own propaganda and worldview. Online forums dedicated to 'pick-up artists' (PUAs) and 'men's rights activism' (MRAs) propagate the view of women as prizes to be won or an enemy to be combated. The most extreme speech seen in these communities can be violent and degrading to the point of qualifying as 'hate speech.' Elliot Rodgers was a participant in such communities and adopted their terminology in his manifesto, such as identifying as an 'incel' (involuntarily celibate) man. When the jargon and beliefs of this worldview are repeated by those who kill in its name, then it is inevitable that people will ask what role it plays in 'radicalizing' some of its adherents toward violence.Crimes like the Isla Vista shootings are invariably described as aberrant tragedies stemming from disturbed minds. Familiar arguments are always raised, revolving around gun control or media sensationalism. Yet if one accepts the legal definition of terrorism as violent crimes carried out in service to an ideology, then perhaps it is time to view such acts of extremist misogyny as political acts of 'lone wolf terrorists.'
Comment See all comments
Trouble clicking? Copy and paste this URL into your browser:
http://tsasblog.wordpress.com/2014/06/23/can-violence-driven-by-extremist-misogyny-constitute-lone-wolf-terrorism/
tsasmanager posted: "by Rob Denaburg, M.A. Candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs. Rob is currently a summer intern at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism in Washington DC. The Canadian government has, on multiple occasion"
New post on THE CANADIAN NETWORK FOR RESEARCH ON TERRORISM, SECURITY, AND SOCIETY
A New Approach to Counter Radicalization
by tsasmanagerby Rob Denaburg, M.A. Candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs. Rob is currently a summer intern at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism in Washington DC.The Canadian government has, on multiple occasions, noted the threat – and acknowledged the existence of – radicalized Canadians going abroad to train with terrorist organizations and potentially partaking in terrorist activity. A Public Safety Canada (PSC) report from 2013 noted that there are likely several dozen such Canadians currently abroad in places like North Africa, Pakistan, Somalia, and the Caucasus, and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) director Michael Coulombe suggested that there are approximately 30 in Syria alone.Canada has recently amended its anti-terror legislation to specifically prohibit Canadians from leaving the country to join foreign terrorist organizations. The only conviction under Canada's anti-terrorism laws – the recent case of Mohammed Hassan Hersi – would fit the under this 'foreign' designation (though he was charged under the original provisions because his arrest occurred prior to the amendment).Not only does Canada want to prevent its citizens from contributing to terrorist activity abroad, there are concerns that individuals like Hersi will return home with training, combat experience, and connections to international terrorist networks. They could be actively seeking to recruit, radicalize and train other Canadians, or even partake in terrorist activities themselves.As defined by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), radicalization is "the process by which individuals – usually young people – are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views." PSC further notes that radicalization is the "precursor to violent extremism."Radicalization on its own is not necessarily dangerous, nor is it a crime; thoughts alone cannot be criminalized. It is the point at which radicalization leads to violent extremism that is a threat. The problem, however, is that there are seemingly few effective options for addressing the issue between the process of radicalization and the point where the individual actually commits – or credibly plots to commit – terrorist acts, known as violent radicalization. This means that many approaches to countering radicalization tend to be reactive rather than proactive.Canada – along with other countries facing similar threats – needs to find a more proactive solution to the issue of radicalization, particularly for foreign fighters whose activities abroad cannot be monitored very easily.In an article from early April, Stewart Bell highlighted the EXIT organization in Germany, whose Hayat program works with those close to highly radicalized foreign fighters, or those aspiring to leave their homes to fight abroad. The program aims to stop those who haven't left from leaving, prevent those who have left from engaging in violent activity, and to try to convince those who have left to return home.EXIT does so by empowering those with an emotional connection to the individual, trying to reduce feelings of isolation or persecution, and cautiously delegitimizing radical interpretations and beliefs. They also help families identify provocation, employ de-escalation strategies, create compromises within certain boundaries while respecting the individual's faith, and present opportunities for them to abandon the path of radicalization. In most cases, the program does not directly involve government authorities, but the Hayat program staff work closely with them and keep them informed of developments.Studies and cases have shown that family and friends can play a critical role in slowing or reversing radicalization. Canada would benefit from a similar program that attempts to use friends and family members to help reverse or at least halt the process of radicalization before individuals become violent, and pose a threat to others at home, abroad, or even themselves.Canadians have been using the German-funded Hayat program because they have nowhere to go for a service like this, but EXIT would rather train Canadians to provide the assistance themselves. There is evidently a need for something similar in Canada, and such a program would be in the Canadian government's interest given the noted threat posed by radicalized Canadian individuals.This is not to say that there aren't Canadian counter radicalization policies in place. In Canada's 2013 counter-terrorism strategy and report on the terrorist threat to Canada, counter-radicalization strategies focus on community-level outreach initiatives intent on mitigating potential violence. The difference, however, is that these are broad efforts aimed at the community as a whole, rather than a more focused and targeted approach.A Senate report does indicate that there are more targeted interventions for those who they suspect are "actively seeking to break the law," but this approach is still more reactive than proactive – it is meant to prevent illegal activity, rather than the process of radicalization that it results from. Adding to the problem is that intervention by law enforcement is likely only to make the individual feel more marginalized, and therefore more prone to radicalization.One caveat to the Hayat model is that the radicalized individuals most intent on fighting abroad will not likely be assisted or deterred by this strategy. Further, approaching radicalized individuals without the necessary tact and understanding of the common narratives of radicalization can have an inverse effect, reinforcing their radical beliefs.That said, learning from the Hayat model and sharing its best practices could provide a Canadian equivalent with the tools necessary for this program to be effective, and this could diminish the threat posed by Canadian foreign fighters to our national security.Image by Tim Shields BC via Flickr.
Comment See all comments
http://tsasblog.wordpress.com/2014/06/23/a-new-approach-to-counter-radicalization/
tsasmanager posted: "by Sam Wollenberg, M.A. Candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs. Sam is an intern at The Mosaic Institute for the Summer of 2014. The debate surrounding immigration policy and reform is one that is never far from the surface in Canada. Recent c"
New post on THE CANADIAN NETWORK FOR RESEARCH ON TERRORISM, SECURITY, AND SOCIETY
New Study Reveals Misconception of "Imported Conflict" in Canada
by tsasmanagerby Sam Wollenberg, M.A. Candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs. Sam is an intern at The Mosaic Institute for the Summer of 2014.The debate surrounding immigration policy and reform is one that is never far from the surface in Canada. Recent controversies that garnered significant public attention include the increasingly obvious failures of the Temporary Foreign Worker program, the designation of Hungary as a "safe" country for the Roma population, ultimately deeming them ineligible for asylum, and the most recent refusal of visitor visas to ten Ugandan gay activists over the fear that they will remain in Canada and seek asylum after their participation in events associated with World Pride and human rights at the end of June in Toronto. Thankfully, one significant portion of the immigration debate can now be laid to rest, particularly in regards to immigrants or refugees from conflict areas, with the release of The Mosaic Institute's study entitled The Perception and Reality of 'Imported Conflict' in Canada. The study, funded by the Kanishka Project from Public Safety Canada, marks the completion of two years of research involving almost 5,000 participants.The Mosaic Institute strove to examine domestic security threats in a unique and constructive way and in the process shed some light on the concept of imported conflict itself, which is located a broad spectrum ranging from tangible, violent events to subtler socio-economic and community dividing tensions. The organization did so by surveying 4,500 Canadians and conducting nationwide interviews and focus groups of another 320, with these participants in particular selected from communities associated with 8 regional conflicts: Afghanistan; Armenia-Turkey; the Balkans; the Horn of Africa; India-Pakistan; Israel-Palestine; Sri Lanka; and The Sudans. The majority, or 57%, of Canadians surveyed, assumed that when individuals or communities from conflict affected areas move to Canada, they import aspects of the violent conflict with them, propagating violence or ethnic tension domestically. This opinion is also reflected in aspects of the debate on immigration policy, most currently in regards to Muslim-Canadians with another prevalent example being the Sri Lankan community.In reality, however, the most resounding and policy influencing finding of the study contradicts this assumption and reveals overarching and complete repudiation of violence as a viable means of responding to conflict domestically once they become Canadian residents. Even the rare opinion of those surveyed who stated violence was still an effective means of achieving their aims in ongoing conflicts from whence they came, their framework for conceptualizing the conflict domestically quite rapidly assumes a Canadian lens or approach, one that encourages dialogue and understanding. Furthermore, the report reveals, the adoption of such values is made much more rapid when social, economic and political inclusion of immigrant communities is enhanced, a point I made in my first blog post, and yet another policy affecting implication of the study.One of the other significant findings to come out of Perception and Reality was what those who leave conflict zones do import—trauma. Understandably, and even obviously to some, whether those interviewed had direct or indirect experiences with violence, trauma was a common thread that linked participants experiences across conflicts. By ignoring or neglecting this fact when implementing public policy, both federally and provincially, it places at risk not just those experiencing the effects of trauma, but also greater communities and potentially the public at large. This in turn can stigmatize entire communities, leading to cycles of racism and exclusion. Providing adequate mental health and trauma related services to immigrants from all countries, but particularly those in which violence is prevalent, will undoubtedly be beneficial for the Canadian government and its citizens.The Mosaic Institutes report serves as an important reminder to policy makers and security analysts everywhere, including fledging ones such as myself, that a perception's prevalence does not negate it as a misconception. Studies such as these with robust participation and methodology further our country's ability to operate and thrive with the values that we have embraced for so long, which in turn strengthens Canada's security and social cohesion. Poorly focused policies, such as profiling the individuals from conflict prone regions themselves, rather than the trauma they have experienced, only propagate distrust and animosity, potentially becoming self-fulfilling prophecies. And, while numerous aspects of the immigration debate must still continue to wage on, Canadians can rest assured and even proudly proclaim, that we have fostered a culture in which largely peaceful means of resolving conflict prevail and violence is checked at the door.What other policy implications does this study hold? What are some other areas where security and immigration merge that could utilize similar studies and methodologies? Has this study changed your perceptions?The Perception and Reality of "Imported Conflict' in Canada, along with its methodology and 15 policy recommendations, can be accessed in English and French here.Image by Mustafa Khayat via Flickr.
Comment See all comments
http://tsasblog.wordpress.com/2014/06/23/new-study-reveals-misconception-of-imported-conflict-in-canada/
tsasmanager posted: "by Kendra Jean von Eyben, J.D./M.A. Candidate at the University of Ottawa and Norman Patterson School of International Affairs While the world is focused on the ongoing confrontation in Ukraine, a more peaceful power transition is happening between the"
New post on THE CANADIAN NETWORK FOR RESEARCH ON TERRORISM, SECURITY, AND SOCIETY
Central Asia after NATO – the unreliable Russia-China alliance
by tsasmanagerby Kendra Jean von Eyben, J.D./M.A. Candidate at the University of Ottawa and Norman Patterson School of International AffairsWhile the world is focused on the ongoing confrontation in Ukraine, a more peaceful power transition is happening between the West and Russia in Central Asia. The 2014 drawdown in Afghanistan means an end to US and allied presence in the region. The transit centre at Manas airport in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic symbolically closed on June 3rd, with the last troops to leave Kyrgyz soil in July. Although the OSCE signed an agreement to continue training locals in counterterrorism measures, and NATO opened a new office in Uzbekistan in May, the main security players in the region will be Russia and China.There is one issue: Russia and China are primarily competitors in Central Asia, not partners. This tension will negatively impact the security situation in the "stans" as the two play for short-term economic influence without considering the long-term picture.The Bear and the DragonRussia and China are more interested in competing over economic resources and influence in the region, than dealing with genuine and serious security issues.The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), founded in 1996, is nominally the main organization for security issues in the region. Its membership includes the two powers along with four of the five Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. Although the SCO is compared to NATO, it is not exclusively a military alliance. The SCO focuses on broad security issues, and claims to be committed to fighting the "three evils" of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism.The SCO should be the primary organization concerned with the NATO withdrawal – three of its member states share borders with Afghanistan: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and China. Instead, the SCO delayed discussing the issues into late 2013, until adamantly rejecting the idea that it would play a role in ensuring security in Afghanistan itself. It prefers to see itself as an exclusively "regional body", ignoring the porous borders that exists between Afghanistan and Central Asia.The SCO's ineffectiveness in addressing the issue can be linked back to fundamental disagreements between Russia and China regarding the future of the Central Asian region – Russia sees the Central Asian region as firmly within its own sphere of influence whereas China is increasingly viewing it as an area that it too may play a dominating role in. Besides long standing competition over energy resources, both countries have recently started large and competing economic integration projects: Russia's Customs Union, which so far includes Belarus and Kazakhstan, has ambitions to "revive the Soviet Union" in the words of some commentators. Meanwhile, China is equally recalling history with its New Silk Road project, meant to link it with Europe through land routes in Central Asia.Enduring holes in Central Asia's security frameworkAlthough economic competition is positive, the unwillingness to seriously engage with the consequences of the NATO withdrawal are worrying – even beyond 2014.A moderate concern exists that violence will spill over from Afghanistan into Central Asia post US withdrawal. Several border guards have been killed in non-SCO member state Turkmenistan, reportedly by Afghan extremists. Central Asian governments themselves, in particular Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, have stressed the danger of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan – a radical group that has fought in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and which may resume activities again in Central Asia. The organization most recently claimed responsibility for the bombing at Karachi airport. Although it should be noted that analysts have expressed skepticism about the level of danger the IMU represents.Russia and China's current attitude is proving to be unhelpful not only regarding the 2014 withdrawal, but also regarding the critical security issues in the region as a whole. In January 2014 Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic engaged in minor border skirmishes in the Fergana valley – an area that lacks clear demarcations between the two countries. Notably and conspicuously absent from the negotiation table on the issue were China and Russia, who both could have stepped in as facilitators. Beyond neglect, analysts express worries that either power may exacerbate insecure situations to gain an advantage in the region.A Security Framework by any other meansRussia and China's sham partnership in the region is disappointing since either genuine concerted effort or competition would be more effective in managing the future stability of the region.Genuine cooperation between Russia and China, although unlikely, would give the SCO a greater chance of becoming an organization that tackled genuine issues. The two countries would be able to mediate between the fractious Central Asian states, and make tough decisions on transnational issues such as borders, terrorism and international crime. Although China and Russia may still not be interested in "taking over" in Afghanistan from the West, a strong partnership would ease fears of a spill-over.Meanwhile, even open competition between the China and Russia would allow for a more concrete, although potentially fragmented, security framework. Russia maintains the Common Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is almost a duplication of the SCO – only without China. The two organizations, essentially running in parallel and without obvious cooperation, are a waste of resources. Furthermore, the existence of these two similar security bodies has reduced the incentive for cooperation – Uzbekistan recently suspended CSTO membership. The cost for Uzbekistan, which remains an SCO member, are negligible – it still is at the least nominally an ally of Russia.The current organizations to handle security are neither fully integrated, nor substantially differing options. This creates doubt and uncertainty as to their effectiveness. The region will be confronted with several difficult security situation in the future, in which case the institutional framework to handle them will prove to be as illusory as the China-Russia partnership. ConclusionCentral Asia, although relatively quiet since the 2010 revolution in the Kyrgyz Republic, remains in a delicate security situation. The countries are poor, and lack the institutional history and knowledge to effectively deal with complex security issues. The Russia-China mentorship in the region has the potential of effectively dealing regional security, however their own economic interests is preventing the partnership from functioning effectively. Instead, stalemate and neglect on major security issues are the trend.
Comment See all comments
http://tsasblog.wordpress.com/2014/06/23/central-asia-after-nato-the-unreliable-russia-china-alliance/
tsasmanager posted: " by Kenneth Martin, PhD Candidate, Concordia University "..there will be another number for the one who had a name…" Stars, "Celebration Guns" As Canadians, we have seen a sudden change in the conception of the military. Over the past decade, it"
New post on THE CANADIAN NETWORK FOR RESEARCH ON TERRORISM, SECURITY, AND SOCIETY
Death, the Profane, and Memory in the Military : The Sacred Dead
by tsasmanagerby Kenneth Martin, PhD Candidate, Concordia University"..there will be another number for the one who had a name…"Stars, "Celebration Guns"As Canadians, we have seen a sudden change in the conception of the military. Over the past decade, it has been pushed into the centre of the debate on Canadian identity. A key part of this has been a revision and a re-emphasis on how we imagine our dead, with a rise in public commemorations of military anniversaries, the highlighting of cenotaphs and memorials[1], and the increase of military imagery in our national symbols. The dead of war – our military dead – serve a central role in this process, as we sanctify their sacrifice through rituals and memory. However, I argue that how we remember our dead is a selective process of forgetting and deletion of their humanity, and this forgetting as practiced, serves instead to degrade the operational ability of the Canadian Armed Forces to respond to modern threats in complex environments, limits us as an evolving democratic society and people, and in fact profanes the dead that we profess to sanctify.CRISIS AND CONTEXTMilitary organizations, despite banal day to day practicalities and occasional brutal rationality, remain a human organization and therefore must include management and acknowledgement of the emotions of its members. Militaries also exist within a wider society, and what functions the military serves, and for whom, are a contested and normal part of domestic politics.The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are undergoing two broad crises of identity. The first springs from domestic politics, and is driven by the effort of the current Government to 're-imagine' the role and place of the CAF[2]. This raises the profile of the CAF in Canadian society, and is broadly modeled on the role the American military plays in the United States, as the carrier of the banner of patriotism and the centre of gravity of national identity. This re-imagining also privileges the role that the military has played in our history, and works to re-brand the military more prominently in a broad effort to revise Canadian history. This process, while politically contentious, is normal[3], and an extensive literature exists already on similar processes.The second crisis is external to Canada, and requires the CAF respond, organizationally, conceptually and politically, the evolving threat environment of the post-Cold War world. This is an exogenous stress – conflict is changing, and militaries find themselves responding to civil conflicts, humanitarian crises, and deploying in multinational coalitions – as well as a domestic stress, as the government struggles to fit the tool of the professional modern military to problems it may not be designed to solve. The first crisis is driven by identity politics within Canada and is fought in terms of names, narratives and labels, and would seem separate from the latter. However, understanding the military as somehow 'sacred', the broad target of the general push of the current Government's re-branding process, will degrade the CAF's operational effectiveness in modern conflict. This is a multi-faceted debate over many terms and structures, but one remains key in my analysis. We must be wary of continuing to understand death in the military in the same way that was used to create and reinforce political structures for hundreds of years, where death was turned into something that served the functions of a given state. This functionality is driven by forgetting individuality, both of 'the enemy' and of 'us'.THE FUNCTIONAL USES OF DEATHAny military organization, in its essence, is human management of violence and death – its most effective delivery upon others, and the limiting of the detrimental effects on our own side. The effects of witnessing, causing and suffering death are, of course, serious : to protect our morale, our ethical foundations as humans, the agreement that the state 'serves' interests that are worthy of the loss of life and the taking of life, the violent deaths of humans must be explained. This explanation must justify these deaths in the short term and the long term. They must be convincing enough for the sustainment of ongoing or planned military operations as well as the wider existence and continuation of the military within society. This explanation is therefore always a selective process of remembering and forgetting. This explanation serves historical and social functions that are well documented[4] : strengthening the line of us/the Other, and thus allowing soldiers to overcome social barriers to killing; serving to create the nation-state as something 'immortal', sacred, and worthy of defense; and the continuation and perpetuation of the military's special place within society.We, as rememberers, forget the existence of any personal doubts they may have had about their mission or the context in which they joined the military (personal zeal, desire for professional experience, conscription, lack of other employment options, etc), and turn them into what we wish to see. More exactly, we turn messy reality of their lives into a manufactured memory that serves the function of the continuance of the state and military, instead of remembering them as themselves. We delete their individuality, their humanness, in the service of a social function and social institution, and we employ the religious terms of the 'sacred' – Arlington Cemetery is the United States' "most sacred shrine"[5]– to define the role and importance of their memory. The deployment of religious language in defense of a state organization also serves to render questions about it, and the humans who died within it, as heretical.The detail about the individuality of each human killed is forgotten in opposite ways – 'our' dead are glorified in cenotaphs, monuments, and national stories, while 'their' dead are vilified and allowed to fade into the background noise of history. Our dead are unproblematic heroes – they were never unable to march in step properly, never were scared, always gave their all, never misused their authority or power, and were always taken care of by their military. They never had useless tasks, officers who led them into danger poorly or uselessly, or were bored out of their minds. Their dead are the faceless, forgotten, mass of the enemy – who were always in the wrong, never fought for their families, never believed in their cause or their God, always followed evil leaders blindly, and spoke strange languages and had barbaric customs.If our dead are sacred, died for causes that were worthy of their sacrifice, and these causes were espoused by our state and our military, then the strongest manifestations of loss, grief and anger that we feel at their deaths are turned away from questioning why they died. No one wants to think their loved one died for nothing, and the narrative of the state fits neatly into this gap[6]. Instead, these feelings are transmuted towards defending the sacredness of the dead, and by extension, the sacredness of their service and the state. The mass death of the Other – civilian or soldier – is also far less problematic, less morally repugnant, and requires us to ask less questions of our government, than it would have otherwise been due to our ability to forget them as complexly human.If we question the state's essential rightness in directing military force, or correctness in applying force that led to the deaths of particular humans in a particular campaign or battle, we also ask implicitly if their deaths meant anything. Ascribing meaning, especially sacred meaning, to the deaths of humans we loved allows us to accept their deaths as 'worth something'. Critically, we use the term "sacrifice" for the deaths of soldiers in war – sacrifice, said by itself, is not worthless. The authority of the state gains much by this process, as it legitimizes itself as the rememberer of a soldier of the state who has taken the place of the human that existed. The state literally washes away its own complexity, that of its wars, and that of the individuals it has sent to death, in blood and makes everything simple, straightforward, and sacred. If it is up to the living to make meaningful the sacrifice of the dead, then certain actions – fight on to total victory! – are prejudged as better, as they respect 'our dead' in ways defined by the state's narrative.MODERN APPLICATION AND THE FAILURE OF FUNCTIONALITYHowever, in an era of increasingly complex conflicts – where the diffusion of state authority, increasingly varied relations of groups across borders, ethnicities and other 'greyness' abounds – that the functions of the dead are not just more obviously irrational[7], they are counter-productive to the conduct and resolution of complex conflicts and the effective deployment of the Canadian Armed Forces in these conflicts. Imaging ourselves and our military in the same way as our predecessors did – as a profession that expresses the national will in a mythic way – continually reinforces the image of the military as was true[8] two hundred years ago, a tool for fighting other professional state militaries and for reinforcing the state's authority. Today however, this image serves to reinforce the cognitive dissonance the military experiences when planning for humanitarian operations, peacekeeping missions, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, or other missions revealingly termed "Operations Other Than War" (OOTW) or "low intensity operations", despite these missions forming the bulk of what the CAF actually does[9]. This self-image also restricts our ability to develop new structures beyond those of a professional mass force that could effectively respond to complex conflicts.Imagining other actors in these conflicts as the Other – as terrorists, OPFOR, Adversary, etc – in the same way that we have done so for hundreds of years means we forget or delete their particularity. Identifying, engaging with, and integrating into complex social conflicts that are founded in human complexity is precisely what is required for effectiveness in "OOTW", and precisely what we remove from our toolset when we fit the Other, and their dead, into a one-dimensional space. Abuses by military personnel when operating within foreign complex environments stem from, in part, the dissonance between how the Enemy 'should' be, according to the narrative of the Other, and the observed and messy lived reality of operations. Understanding the military as flatly sacred damages operational performance and limits our capabilities unnecessarily.Furthermore, selective forgetting also does not sanctify the personal memory of humans who have served, or serve, in militaries. In addition to professionally, it also socially and morally limits us. It limits our evolution as a society – we forget the complex human nature of soldiers who have died, and instead transmute them into one dimensional symbols of enduring loyalty, sacrifice and bravery. Their revised memory now serves to perpetuate one single understanding of what a military is and should do – and with each sacrifice of a newly nameless detailess hero/ine, we are forced away from any decisions that are perceived to 'devalue' their 'sacrifice'. These decisions may be operationally necessary – combining one Regiment into another is decried as forgetting its storied history and demeaning its dead – but they will be resisted emotionally, to the eventual detriment and risk of the personnel of the CAF. We can only question the actions or decisions of the dead with great difficulty, and we therefore limit our ability to adapt and evolve in an era that requires adaptation and evolution at a greater pace than before.I do not argue that this process is being orchestrated by the Government or the military itself – the sacredness of the dead and of the institution they served is received from previous generations. It is the dominant narrative both inside and outside the military, and should not be considered as some sort of deliberate plan. Individuals may choose to perpetuate it to increase the importance of the institution, or to re-imagine what 'Canada' means through the use of remembering and forgetting. However, those who perpetuate this idea only damage the CAF's ability to respond to modern threats, and also restrict all Canadians from having an open and current debate on the role, needs, and uses of military force in our society. They also limit military professionals from questioning basic organizational assumptions and structures, which may need to evolve in response to pressing operational needs or to strategic over-the-horizon threats. Should the CAF absorb more constabulary roles or directly in domestic operations, should the CAF protect Canadian economic interests abroad, should the CAF retain or shed personnel? - these are all questions that are influenced by how 'sacred' we view the military, despite it simply being a constructed and flawed human institution .THE SACRED DEAD AS LIMITATIONFinally, forgetting the individuality of military dead serves to continually privilege one historically rooted understanding of social organization, the state, over others that may or may not be the best model for promoting human rights, democracy, social justice, or other values that we have written into the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I am not arguing that the state is detrimental to humanity, but instead that burying the ability to ask the question under the weight of the sacred dead damages our society, restricts our ability to succeed in foreign affairs, and puts CAF personnel at risk. It also limits us as Canadians in our debates and struggles for a more equitable and free society.In the end analysis, forgetting the individuality of soldiers is a normal historical process that has been, and will likely continue to be, a key part of the toolbox of the dominance of the state as a political structure. Despite this pressure, modern complex conflict and modern complex society both demand that we as citizens and those of us who are soldiers constantly think critically and question received knowledge. We must be aware constantly that forgetting our dead's human particularity limits us as a society in development and limits the profession of arms itself, by limiting our ability to imagine ourselves as seen by others, to respond effectively to complex conflicts, and to evolve in response to future needs. Forgetting also serves one conception of the state among others exceptionally well by channeling grief that could instead demand hard questions, and transmutes grief into impassioned defense of the state's right to exist, govern, and use military force. We must also remember that, as humans, forgetting any individual human being's self with all its particularity, faults, and strengths, is not sanctifying them. It is instead profaning them and their now forgotten humanity in order that they may serve the imagined needs of one organization among others.Opinions expressed in the articles remain those of the author and do not represent those of the Department of National Defence, Government of Canada, or Canadian Armed Forces.[1]The Vimy Memorial, as a key example.[2]Including, most recently, adding the term "Armed" to the name of the Canadian Forces, adding "Royal" to the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal Canadian Air Force, and the overall push for the re-imagining of the role of the war of 1812.[3]In the sense of commonly done by governments throughout history. Objectively, what defines a nation is not a permanent narrative, and is changed by groups within society – often governments – for their own reasons and benefits.
[4]Without specifically citing authors, generally the field of sociology deals most with this process – Anderson's "Imagined Communities" is especially incisive on the use of monuments for this purpose. See also Grossman's "On Killing" and Hedges' "War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning" for a historical and literature take on the general process, as well.[5]Sign upon entry to Arlington National Cemetery, VA, USA.[6]There are rituals associated with this, which mirror religious ones in telling ways. The gold stars in the window of the USA in the Second World War, the giving of a flag to the next of kin, etc, but they are always rituals which use the symbol of the state. Indeed, military funerals literally wrap up the dead in the state's emblem – not the individual's own life story.[7]I do not argue that it has ever been objectively "good" – however, the rationale for these functions serving the needs of survival of a mass citizen army and supporting nationalist identity strengthening the nation-state is clearer and makes more 'sense'.[8]This is of course arguable, as military forces have always had a variety of roles, organisatons, and narratives throughout history beyond the 'official' version.[9]This is not an argument for or against the deployment of the CAF in complex conflicts – this article is not pro or anti Powell Doctrine. However, when we examine what the CAF does as a proportion of time, this cognitive dissonance is clearly problematic, and leads to the CAF disregarding hard won lessons about complex conflict.
Comment See all comments
http://tsasblog.wordpress.com/2014/06/23/death-the-profane-and-memory-in-the-military-the-sacred-dead/
tsasmanager posted: "by Alana N. Cook, PhD Student, Simon Fraser University, Department of Psychology The assessment and management of risk for terrorist violence: How psychologists are contributing to the prevention of terrorist violence in Canada Psychologists play a "
New post on THE CANADIAN NETWORK FOR RESEARCH ON TERRORISM, SECURITY, AND SOCIETY
How Psychologists are Contributing to the Prevention of Terrorist Violence in Canada
by tsasmanagerby Alana N. Cook, PhD Student, Simon Fraser University, Department of PsychologyThe assessment and management of risk for terrorist violence: How psychologists are contributing to the prevention of terrorist violence in CanadaPsychologists play a unique and critical role in preventing terrorist violence through (1) the development and validation of risk assessment tools and (2) the implementation of these tools to effectively assess and manage terrorist violence risk.Terrorism and other forms of group-based violenceIt is well accepted in psychology that an individual's decisions and behaviour are influenced by the social groups they belong to. Principles from social psychology – group theory, group dynamics, and group interaction – provide a basis for understanding how social groups influence behaviour at the individual level, including engagement in violent behaviour (see Pynchon & Borum, 1999). Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that the same group processes apply across different types of groups. That is, group processes that impact terrorist groups are largely the same as those that impact other potentially violent groups, such as gangs and organized crime groups (see Monahan, 2011). As such, we can understand and potentially assess for terrorist violence using similar principles that apply across various forms of groups (for a detailed discussion see Cook, Hart, & Kropp, 2013).The World Health Organization (WHO) lists violence committed by members of groups as an important subtype of violence causing concern worldwide. The WHO indicates that group-based violence has increased over the last thirty years and represents a daily challenge and threat for criminal justice agencies that protect public safety internationally. Group-based violence may be defined as actual, attempted, or threatened physical injury that is deliberate and nonconsensual, perpetrated by one or more individuals whose decisions and behavior are influenced by a group to which they currently belong or with which they are affiliated (see Cook, Hart, & Kropp, 2013).Canada faces the challenge and threat of many forms of group-based violence, including terrorist violence. In 2012, there were 114 incidents of terrorist violence in Canada (less than one per 100,000 in the population; see Statistics Canada, 2013). The majority of incidents in 2012 were related to hoax terrorist activity (71 incidents; 62%). The remainder included 19 incidents of participating in an activity of a terrorist group (17%), 15 incidents of providing or making available property or services for terrorist purposes (13%), and 5 incidents of facilitating terrorist activity (4%)[i]. Although official statistics for 2013 are not yet available, Canadian law enforcement agencies thwarted two major terrorist plots last year: an alleged plot to bomb the BC Legislature on Canada Day and an alleged plot to derail a VIA Rail train in the Toronto area. In both cases, legal decision makers were required to determine if the alleged suspects were at risk to commit future violence in determining bail. Authorities are also routinely asked to determine if convicted terrorism offenders should be released from detention before their warrant of expiry. The operational and legal decisions made in these types of cases are similar to those made daily in cases of other forms of violence, such as homicide, intimate partner violence, and sexual violence, that threat assessment professionals responded to often using validated risk assessment tools to inform their assessment and management decisions.Psychologists are internationally recognized for the development and research of risk assessment tools for various forms of violence riskCanada has long been internationally recognized for our progressive efforts to create and utilize risk assessment guidelines to prevent violence. Risk assessment tools have been developed, validated, and widely implemented for various forms of violence risk (e.g., intimate partner violence, sexual violence). Researchers have cautioned, however, that traditional risk assessment tools have limited applicability when used with terrorists, whose actions are often influenced by or take place in the context of groups (see Monahan, 2011).Until recently, there were no risk assessment tools for the individual assessment and management of terrorism. The development and validation of risk assessment tools is one way psychologists are contributing to the prevention of terrorist violence. One new risk assessment tool developed by my colleagues, Dr. Stephen Hart and Dr. Randall Kropp, and I is a structured professional judgment tool for comprehensive, management-oriented assessment of group-based violence, including terrorist violence, called the Multi-Level Guidelines, or MLG.It is imperative that all of the recently developed tools that examine risk for terrorist violence be evaluated for utility, reliability, and validity of the use of these tools in practice. Internationally psychologists are involved in the development and validation of new tools and are conducting research on the risk and protective factors of engaging in terrorist violence. Many of the leading researchers in this area are Canadian, such as TSAS Senior Research Affiliate Dr. Elaine Pressman.Utility and Reliability of the Multi-Level Guidelines (MLG).Recent research supported by a Kanishka Project Contribution from Public Safety Canada on the MLG indicated that that psychologists and other threat assessment professionals (i.e., criminal justice, security, and intelligence analysts) found the MLG useful for their practice and judgments concerning the presence of risk factors, as well as the nature and level of risks posed for terrorism and other forms of group-based violence using the MLG, were made with a degree of reliability comparable to that reported in evaluations of other risk assessment tools. Requests for a detailed copy of these results may be made to: alanac@sfu.ca.Psychologists conduct risk assessments to inform risk management plans that aim to prevent violenceForensic psychologists are frequently employed to assist law enforcement, psychiatric review boards, judges, juries, and other key decision makers to determine the risk that an individual poses for future violence and how to best manage the risk of that individual so they do not commit violence in the future (see Hart & Logan, 2011). Forensic psychologists implore risk assessment guidelines, like the MLG, to make systematic and standardized decisions about the potential for future violence risk in a given case to assist decision makers. The assessment of terrorist violence requires the integration of individual-level factors (e.g., history of violence, lack of pro-social integration) and group-level factors (e.g., group identify, group norms) that influence that individual to engage in violence. While psychologists are often asked to conduct these assessments, no one person of any profession can competently and comprehensively assess an individual's risk for group-based violence. Psychologists completing these assessments will be reliant on those with a group-level professional focus– such as criminologists and crime intelligence analysts – to obtain group-level data necessary for the assessment. Psychologist are also in a position to train and assist other professionals in implementing these type of risk assessment guides. Similarly, other professionals completing these assessments will be reliant on those with individual-level professional focus (e.g., law enforcement officers who focus on individuals, parole officers) or a group-level professional focus to augment their own expertise and experiences.Discussion QuestionsIn addition to the development and implementation of violence risk assessment tools to assessment and manage terrorist violence risk, what other ways may psychologists contribute to preventing terrorism in Canada?The assessment of group-based violence assumes membership or affiliation with a group - a group refers to an identifiable collective of two or more individuals who have some stable pattern of associations based to some extent on shared attitudes, norms, values, or goals. What about cases on lone actors whose affiliation or connection with a group is non-existent (e.g., delusional affiliation) or unimportant to their risk for violence?[i] Potential crimes related to terrorism in Canada includes: hoax terrorist activity, participating in the activity of a terrorist group, commission of offence for terrorist group, facilitating terrorist activity, instructing to carry out terrorist activity, providing or making available property or services for terrorist purposes, using or possessing property or services for terrorist purposes, harbouring or concealing (terrorist) and freezing of property, disclosure and audit (terrorism).
Comment See all comments
http://tsasblog.wordpress.com/2014/06/23/how-psychologists-are-contributing-to-the-prevention-of-terrorist-violence-in-canada/
Thanks for flying with WordPress.com
No comments:
Post a Comment