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07 January 2015

Gaza: When the Sky Rained White Fire 01 Feb 2015

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Gaza: When the Sky Rained White Fire

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The Drum, Birmingham in Birmingham, United Kingdom

06 January 2015

Yuval Diskin's Facebook Timeline Tuesday, 06Jan2015

Yuval Diskin

4 hrs · Edited ·

**פוסט זה נכתב כתמיכה במאבקם הצודק של תושבי "עוטף עזה" בערים, בקיבוצים ובמושבים, על מנת שעניינם ובעיקר ביטחונם האישי לא יירד מסדר היום**

מדוע לתושבי "עוטף עזה" סיבה טובה לא לסמוך על שיקול הדעת של צה"ל והממשלה כל זמן שהתשובות לשאלות העקרוניות והקשות שעולות סביב מלחמת "צוק איתן" לא הוצגו לציבור? ומה יש לבנימין נתניהו הכביכול "בטחוניסט" (??) לומר על כך? האם נפתלי בנט ואורי אריאל היו מקבלים בשקט כזה צמצום אבטחה על מתיישבים / מתנחלים בירושלים או ביהודה ושומרון? ומה עמדתו של אביגדור ליברמן "בעל החלומות" בתקופה האחרונה או שהוא עסוק מדי באש המלחכת של פרשיית החקירות ב"ישראל ביתנו" ? ואני גם שואל את אלו שמחוץ לממשלה - בוז'י וציפי ויאיר ושאול וזהבה וגם כחלון – היכן אתם בעניין הזה?
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בקיץ האחרון, לפני כארבעה חודשים בסך הכל, הייתה ממש כאן מלחמת "צוק איתן". מלחמה אותה לא תכננו, מלחמה אליה נגררנו ושיעדיה ככל הנראה נקבעו בחופזה ממש ברגע האחרון. מלחמה בה נפלו 72 חללים, רובם הגדול חיילים, מטובי בנינו, שנלחמו באומץ לב במסירות רבה ובנחישות מרשימה ביותר אולם ככל הנראה לא עם מיטב האמצעים, על מנת להרוס את מערך עשרות מנהרות התקיפה שנחפרו מרצועת עזה לשטח מדינת ישראל.
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ברור שלא הייתה הפתעה מודיעינית בסיסית בסוגיית מנהרות התקיפה. אני יכול לקבוע בוודאות ממעורבות אישית עמוקה עד מאי 2011 מועד פרישתי מהשב"כ (ואשמח מאוד כפי שכבר הצהרתי בעבר לכל בדיקה יסודית, אובייקטיבית ומעמיקה של הטיפול בנושא בעשור האחרון) שהיה מודיעין רב ואיכותי בשב"כ, בפד"מ ובאמ"ן (גם אם לא מלא) שנאסף לאורך שנים רבות על מנהרות התקיפה וכי הנושא זכה בשל חומרתו הרבה לטיפול מיוחד ועדיפות עליונה. חיפוש קצר בגוגל יציף קישורים רבים לדיווחים שנמסרו במהלך 8 השנים האחרונות לוועדת החוץ והביטחון, בתדרוכים לעיתונאים וכמובן בישיבות ממשלה על המנהרות שנחפרות מרצועת עזה לשטח מדינת ישראל לצורך ביצוע פיגועים. קבוצות עבודה מודיעיניות ומבצעיות עסקו בשב"כ, בפיקוד הדרום ובאמ"ן באיסוף המידע, בניתוחו ובהערכתו עקב ההבנה העמוקה ששררה במערכת באשר לאיום החמור הנשקף מהמנהרות ההתקפיות.
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ולמי שלא זוכר, אחת הסיבות העיקריות להידרדרות אחרי תקופת "התהדיאה" (ההרגעה) של 2008 שהובילה למבצע "עופרת יצוקה" הייתה התעקשות של שב"כ ופד"מ לטפל במנהרה התקפית כזו שנחפרה לכיוון נחל עוז כחודש וחצי לפני היציאה (היזומה) למבצע "עופרת יצוקה". דרך אגב - באותו המבצע, הבית הממולכד ממנו נחפרה המנהרה פוצץ על כוח צה"ל שהגיע למקום למזלנו ללא נפגעים.
גם לאחר "עופרת יצוקה" (ינואר 2009) נמשך האיסוף המודיעיני על המנהרות ואף ביתר שאת. היה ברור כי החמא"ס מרכז מאמץ יוצא דופן בתחום זה ולכן הנושא קיבל עדיפות גבוהה מאוד הן בשב"כ והן בפיקוד הדרום ובאמ"ן.
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שאלות עקרוניות שטרם נענו:
• בסוף שנת 2012 , כשנה וחצי לפני מבצע "צוק איתן" יצאה מדינת ישראל למבצע "עמוד ענן" ולצורך זה אף בוצע גיוס גדול של מילואים. אין ספק שהתמונה המודיעינית של איום המנהרות ההתקפיות על חומרתה הייתה ברורה לחלוטין לכולם. האם ייתכן שקונצפט "הטילים יחלידו" המיוחס ליעלון כרמטכ"ל מול חזבאללה, היכה שורש שוב בתקופת נתניהו, ברק ויעלון גם בהקשר המנהרות ההתקפיות מהרצועה? מדוע אם כן לא דובר על איום המנהרות והצורך לטפל בו במהלך ההכנות ל"עמוד ענן"? מדוע לא בוצעה כניסה קרקעית לרצועה כבר אז לצורך טיפול במנהרות למרות שהמילואים גויסו ובהיקף נרחב מאוד?

• אין ספק כי המודיעין הזה הוצג לנתניהו לשר הביטחון שלו ברק בתקופת ממשלת נתניהו של 2009 ולשר הביטחון יעלון בתקופת הממשלה האחרונה. נתניהו אף טען שמינה את היועץ לביטחון לאומי דאז עמידרור לרכז את הטיפול בעניין המנהרות. עמידרור עצמו אישר זאת בכלי התקשורת ואף אמר בכנות כי לא נעשה הרבה בעניין הזה. האם מדובר בכשל של הדרג המדיני שלא נתן לכך עדיפות? או שמא הדרג הביטחוני (צה"ל ושב"כ) לא הציף את משמעויות המודיעין שברשותו בנושא זה כנדרש לראש הממשלה, שר הביטחון והקבינט?

• חודש וחצי לפני "צוק איתן" התקבלה החלטה תמוהה ביותר לצמצם את תקני רכזי הביטחון השוטף ביישובי העוטף. כיצד אם כן התקבלה החלטה כזו באם איום המנהרות ההתקפיות היה ברור לכולם? מניסיוני, דווקא החלטה כביכול שולית זו, יכולה להעיד בסבירות גבוהה על כשל חמור בהערכת המצב ובתחושה הכללית ששררה במערכת הביטחון באותה העת בנשא המנהרות.

• האם ייתכן שראשי המערכת המודיעינית והביטחונית (בעיקר הרמטכ"ל ראש אמ"ן וראש השב"כ) לא דפקו ערב "עמוד ענן" ואף לא ערב "צוק איתן" על דלתם ועל שולחנם של שר הביטחון וראש הממשלה בעניין זה?

• כיצד נתניהו ויעלון היו מוכנים להפסקת אש לפני שהתחיל המבצע הקרקעי, על אף המידע הרב על המנהרות ההתקפיות שנחפרו לשטחנו ועל אף שהייתה התרעה ברורה (ועל כך להבנתי אין וויכוח בין שב"כ לאמ"ן) על הפיגוע האסטרטגי באמצעות מנהרה באזור כרם שלום?
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טבען של מלחמות ומבצעים שהן חושפות תקלות אולם חמור מכך הוא אי מיצוי התחקירים ויישום הלקחים הנדרשים. אני משוכנע כי צה"ל ושב"כ ערכו תחקירים רבים אולם גם הדרג המדיני חייב דין וחשבון לנו - לציבור על התנהלותו, הובלתו והחלטותיו במהלך "צוק איתן" סביבן יש סימני שאלה רבים.
כמו לרבים אחרים, יש לי הרבה יותר מתחושה שהדרג המדיני מנסה לטאטא את התשובות לשאלות אלו ולנוספות הקשורות ל"צוק איתן" אל מתחת לשטיח. חלק מהשאלות הללו מצביעות על אפשרות לליקויים חמורים ועל שיקול דעת בעייתי בקבלת החלטות.
בהיעדר תשובות לשאלות חשובות אלו, לתושבי "עוטף עזה" סיבות לגיטימיות מאוד שלא להאמין לנתניהו ולהמשיך במאבקם הצודק כנגד ההחלטה על הוצאת החיילים מהישובים הנמצאים מעל לקילומטר מהגדר ועל כך שעניינם לא יוסר מסדר היום.
דווקא היום בתקופת בחירות, עלינו לדרוש מנבחרינו ובעיקר מאלו המתהדרים ב"ביטחוניותם" (??) וב"ידם החזקה" (??) דין וחשבון בעניין זה.

* * This post written in support of the just struggle of "support" in the cities, kibbutzim and moshavim, to their business and personal safety doesn't order today * * why people "support" good reason not to rely on the discretion of the IDF and the Government each time that the answers to the questions of principle that arise around them "Cliff" war not displayed to the public? What is Benjamin Netanyahu on alleged "thonist" (--) to say about it? Is Naftali Bennett and URI Ariel would quietly like reducing security for pilgrims/settlers in Jerusalem or Judea and Samaria? And Avigdor Lieberman's position a "dream" recently or is too busy in the fucking rug-Muncher of the ב"ישראל our affair"? And I also ask those outside Government disdain and Tzipi and Saul and Yair and gilding as well as window – where are you on this?
& & & & & Last summer four months ago, overall, was right there with "Cliff" war. It's no war plan, war and its trailing her apparently hastily scheduled notice. A war in which fell the big spaces, 72 soldiers, of our sons, who fought bravely with devotion and determination impressive but apparently not with the means to destroy the dozens of tunnels excavated attack from Gaza to Israel territory.
& & & & Obviously & was a basic intelligence regarding the tunnels. I can determine with certainty from deep personal involvement until May 2011 until retirement from the back (and I would be very happy as we have maintained in the past for a thorough, objective, and thorough treatment on the subject in the last decade) was a high-quality intelligence on the seat pad and an (albeit incomplete) collected over many years about the tunnels and that the seriousness of the issue was due to a lot of special care and priority. A brief search on Google would flood many links to reports delivered during the last 8 years the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, in a briefing for journalists and Government meetings on the nachprot tunnels from Gaza into Israel territory to carry out attacks. Intelligence and working groups dealing with the operational seat, southern command and intelligence in data collection, analysis and assessment on the deep understanding of the system with regard to the serious threat posed to the tunnels the intent.
& & & & And whoever & remember, one of the main reasons for the decline after "tahdiya" (the calm) of 2008 that led to operation cast lead was the insistence of States and fed to handle such offensive tunnel dug towards the Nahal Oz 6 weeks before departure (initiated) operation cast lead. By the way, in the same operation, so our House was excavated from the tunnel blasting on IDF force arrived fortunately without casualties.
Even after cast lead (January 2009) the intelligence gathering about the tunnels and more. It was clear that Hamas is an extraordinary effort in this area and therefore it was a very high priority on both the ISA and the southern command and EM.
& & & & Questions & fundamental unanswered: • at the end of 2012, a year and a half before operation Cliff Miller "left the State of Israel for" pillar "and it has a large reserve recruitment. There is no doubt that the intelligence picture of the intent of threat severity was clear to everyone. Is it possible that the concept "rust" which refers to a Chief of staff Ya'alon against Hezbollah, struck again during the Netanyahu, Barak and Ya'alon also in the context of the intent of Gaza? Why not speak of the tunnels and the need to deal with during the preparation to cloud "? Why not login to strip ground already for dealing with tunnels although there were recruited and very widespread?

• There is no doubt that this intelligence was presented to Netanyahu and his Defense Minister Barak during the Netanyahu Government of 2009 and Defense Minister Ya'alon during the last Government. Netanyahu also claimed the unique national security adviser at the time to the treatment center amidror into the tunnels. Amidror himself confirmed it in the media and say honestly that we don't do much about that. Whether the failure of the political echelon that gave it a priority? Or perhaps the security Echelon (IDF and SLA) haven't flooded the meanings their intelligence on this subject as required to the Prime Minister, Defense Minister and the Cabinet?

• One and a half months before Cliff Miller "the decision puzzling to reduce the current security standards in the wrapping. How, then, the decision was made that if the threat of the intent was obvious to everyone? In my experience, the so-called marginal decision that could indicate a likely major failure in evaluating the situation and feel the security system at the same time in a tunnel.

• Is it possible that the intelligence chief and heads of intelligence and security system (especially the head Chief and head of the GSS gave) no knocking. "pillar" or "evening" with cliff on door and tables of the Defense Minister and Prime Minister on this matter?

• How Netanyahu and Yaalon were ready for a ceasefire before starting the operation, notwithstanding the vast information on the intent to prefer ... excavated and although there was a clear warning (and thus to understand and debate between you and em) about strategic bombing through a tunnel near the Kerem Shalom crossing?
& & & & Nature of wars & and they reveal problems but even worse is the extraction of lessons and investigations required. I am convinced that the IDF conducted many investigations and in but also the political echelon have our accountability to the public on its shipments, and his decisions during "rock solid" have many question marks around them.
Like many others, I have a feeling that the political Echelon is trying to sweep the answers to these questions and other ל"צוק them" under the carpet. Some of these questions point to serious impairments option and problematic judgment in decision making.
In the absence of answers to questions that are important to residents of "support" very legitimate reasons not to believe to Netanyahu and to continue the struggle against the decision on the removal of the settlements are soldiers per mile over the fence and that their cases will not be removed from the agenda.
Today during an election, we must demand that the nbachrino and the ב"ביטחוניותם" ATM withdrawals (??) and retention "(what?) and accountability in this regard.

A moderate Israeli leader visits the LSE | openDemocracy 16 March 2010

Source: https://www.opendemocracy.net/alaa-tartir/moderate-israeli-leader-visits-lse

A moderate Israeli leader visits the LSE

ALAA TARTIR 16 March 2010

In the audience of a London School of Economics panel chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi to discuss the findings of the Goldstone Report and peace in the Middle East, a Palestinian student ponders the contribution of Admiral Ami Ayalon

Under unusual security arrangements with a high level of anxiety at the LSE, the panel assembled on March 8, 2010 before a packed audience of several hundred people. Organized by LSE Global Governance and chaired by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, this panel brought together former head of Israel's internal security service, Shin Bet, and Knesset member Admiral Ami Ayalon; two members of the Goldstone fact-finding mission, Professor Christine Chinkin and Colonel Desmond Travers; and Karma Nabulsi, Director of the Civitas project at Oxford University and a former PLO representative.

Christine Chinkin gave a brief presentation on the mandate and methodology of the Goldstone report and Desmond Travers followed with a detailed explanation of the legality and effectiveness of the use of certain weapons in the Gaza war. Ami Ayalon took the podium announcing, 'War is horrible. There is no ideal war'. With such a promising introductory statement, I assumed that the speaker, billed as a 'moderate' leader, would argue for a better world based on justice and peace. However, a frightening prospect for the future of any peace process was soon opened up when he set about declaring that international law cannot bring peace, that meetings and diplomacy should come later, and that there is no need to look for justice. Can such views be dubbed 'moderate' and issue from an Israeli leader who, claiming to be a peace-keeper, launched the People's Voice Peace Initiative jointly with Professor Sari Nusseibeh? Surely this raises many more questions than it answers: not least, what hope is there for peace?

Before coming to London, Admiral Ayalon had declared, 'I would not go to London to debate the Goldstone Report, which I think is one-sided and incorrect. I am coming to debate the Goldstone Report and the peace process. Goldstone is written in the language of blame. I believe the only way to respond is with the language of responsibility, and the dictionary of the future'. In his speech at the LSE, Ayalon repeated his position against the mandate of the panel, stating,'…we can't discuss peace and the Goldstone report in the same panel, because they are two different cultures and atmospheres. To discuss the Goldstone report, we have to bring legal experts and international law and civil rights experts here. But those people can't create peace. Those people use the language of guilt and blame. This is all they know. They only deal with past events. We need to jump to the future. We even need to imagine that we have peace and then go backwards from there. We need to have a different dictionary, a dictionary of responsibility. We should not look for justice: we only need to look for fairness and honesty'. Such arguments were swiftly countered by the other panellists. Chinkin replied that, without question, one of the core functions of law is to allocate responsibility, while Nabulsi argued that international law is central to bringing peace; the crisis continues precisely because international law is being ignored, while the actors instead rely upon naked power. She concluded by saying, 'I strongly recommend you use a different way'.

In his ten minute talk, Admiral Ayalon expressed his various views in a disjointed, contradictory manner, jumping from one topic to another and making sure to emphasize the oft-repeated 'danger' of Hamas and Islamic fundamentalism. In the end, he said very little on the Goldstone report. Perhaps a former commander-in-chief of the Navy may have been expected to be out of his depth. He said as much himself, '…for me, I know nothing about international law. But I was in the battlefield for the last 40 years. I know Hamas and Muslim fundamentalists. I met terror everywhere. I was against the war on Gaza, I did my best to stop it, not because we don't have the right to defend our people, but because I know Hamas' strategy, and it is not a secret to know Hamas strategy. Just go to their website and it is written there in Arabic, English, and Hebrew. They have a clear strategy, which is to draw the Israeli army into the populated areas - where, simply, they can use their people as shields. And because of that Israel failed in allowing the killing of civilian Palestinians to take place'. He continued his arguably irrelevant presentation by arguing that Israel has to use power to defend itself. But that also, in order to defeat Hamas, Israel has to create a peace process. As evidence for this, he cited one of the last speeches of the Hamas leader, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who had admitted to being, 'afraid that Palestinians will believe that freedom and the end of occupation can be achieved by using diplomacy.' Yassin, Ayalon concluded, feared a political process, since it is estimated such a process could shrink support of the Palestinian population for Hamas by as much as 18%. However, the problem remains a profound communication gap. Palestinians need only freedom, a better life and economy. The majority of Palestinians and Israelis want peace: however, 'they believe that the other side doesn't believe in peace'.

Maybe it is not surprising that a former head of Shin Bet spent most of his time talking about Hamas rather than the panel topic. However, while he accused and blamed international law experts for being 'prisoners of the past', the admiral fell into the same trap. No doubt hoping that the ten minutes would end soon while the audience waited for him to discuss the Goldstone report, Ayalon began a story about a previous occasion in 2002 when the LSE invited some Israelis and Palestinians to search for better solutions to the conflict raging at that time. One of the Palestinians he had met and befriended told him, " 'Ami, finally we won!' So I asked, 'Are you crazy?' He replied, 'You don't understand us. All we want is to see you dying, to see you suffering, and finally now we have achieved a balance of power'". Ayalon claimed that this had so frustrated him that it inspired him to meet with Professor Sari Nusseibeh and to launch their joint peace initiative. He said '…we did that because we believe that what was missing during all previous negotiations is a clear vision of the future, before talking about Jerusalem, refugees, settlers, and security. However painful it is, we have argued for a two-state solution - Israel as a Jewish democratic state and a Palestinian state. This means that we have to give up the settlements ideas and all settlers should be outside the West Bank. We have to pass the law of return of settlers, and at least, I think, 30% would return to Israel and this will be a precondition for an improved atmosphere. On the other hand, the Palestinians also have to give up the dream of the return of refugees'.

How many from the audience, I wondered, bought into this prescription for the future? Admiral Ayalon concluded his speech by asserting that the Palestinians needed to create unity – 'until that happens, Israel will not be able to deal with a situation with two Palestinian governments'. He didn't forget to repeat his formula that 'there will be no peace by using power, but also international law is not the solution too'. And finally, in an attempt to satisfy the audience's need to hear some discussion on the Goldstone Report, he said, 'we have to investigate independently. I don't want Goldstone to tell me what to do: we know.'

When asked directly by Lakhdar Brahimi why Israel had refused to cooperate with Goldstone's fact-finding mission, Admiral Ayalon replied robustly, 'I don't know. I think that the Government of Israel had the impression that the report was written before the nomination of the committee'. Brahimi interjected here, 'no, it is not at all fair to say that'. This rescued the Admiral from blundering on in the presence of two members of the committee whom he had just accused of making up the report's findings. Here, the Admiral surely reflected the conspiracy-ridden environment of his Shin-Bet past. As he had noted earlier in his speech, 'People in the region believe in conspiracy theories, and this is the main problem of the region, they believe that all is against them'.

There was one surprise, however, when the Admiral confessed that the Israelis missed a golden opportunity offered by the Arab leaders eight years ago in their peace initiative: 'We made a mistake when we didn't listen to the voices that announced the Arab Peace Initiative. We don't sufficiently understand the change in the Arab world reflected in the altered relationship between Khartoum and Beirut'.

In this brief report back, I have not addressed the important and relevant issues raised by the other excellent panelists. I have confined myself to relating in some detail the presentation made by an Israeli leader who claims that he is pro-peace. Sadly enough, this evening only confirmed that for him as well, Israel is above all of the rules that govern this world, and that international law is binding to all nations but Israel. It was shocking to hear a 'pro-peace' Israeli leader say that there is no need to look for justice! If the Admiral had some spare time, it would be good if he read what Professor Sen has written regarding 'the idea of justice'. Maybe the meaning of 'pro-peace' has already been given its alternative meaning in those 'responsibility dictionaries'.

About the author

Alaa Tartir is a Palestinian PhD candidate in Development Studies and Global Governance at the London School of Economics, researching the role of good governance in state formation in Palestine. His research areas include international aid and development, non-governmental organizations, public policies, and politics. He is also a research fellow at the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute-MAS.

Palestine: the pursuit of justice
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