Showing posts with label the Shin Bet. Show all posts
Showing posts with label the Shin Bet. Show all posts

13 July 2016

Shabak: Monthly Summary – June 2016

Source:http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/Reports/Pages/ReportE0616.aspx


Israel Security Agency>Terror Data and Trends>Reports>Monthly Summary – June 2016 
Monthly Summary – June 2016
Five Israelis were killed and 21 injured in June's terror attacks. Most of the fatalities were registered during the shooting in Tel Aviv on 8 June that left four dead and 15 wounded. An Israeli teenager was stabbed to death on 30 June in Qiryat Arba, Hebron, and another civilian was moderately injured.

Other injuries: 2 civilians in a vehicle ramming attack near Qiryat Arba (24 June); a member of the security forces in a firebomb attack in Isawiya, northern Jerusalem, (29 June); 2 civilians in a stabbing attack in Netanya on 30 June.

Jewish terror attacks: two vehicles were set on fire on 10 June in Yafa An-Naseriyye, Nazareth. Three other vehicles were covered in graffiti with the slogans "Price tag", "We'll kill you", and "Revenge".

Data regarding terror attacks in June 2016
Following is a regional distribution of attacks:  1 attack from the Gaza Strip, (16 in May); 71 attacks in the Judea and Samaria (67 in May); 29attacks in Jerusalem (17 in May); 2 within the "Green Line" (1 in May).
Jerusalem and the Judea and Samaria area: Most attacks executed inJune 86 out of 100 were in the form of firebombs (May: 65 out of84). 


Distribution of attacks according to regions and pattern profile:

Following is a distribution of attacks in June 2016 according to regions: 

The Gaza Strip – one attack: small arms shooting.

Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem – 100 attacks: 10 IED (including pipe bombs and improvised grenade); 2 small arms shooting; 1 stabbing; 1 run over; 86 firebombs (29 in Jerusalem).

The "Green Line" – 2 attacks: shooting attack in Tel Aviv; stabbing attack in Netanya.


High-trajectory launchings from Gaza Strip and Sinai

 Throughout June 2016 no rockets or mortar shells were launched** from the Gaza Strip towards Israel, as opposed to May in which three rockets were launched** (within 2 attacks) and 19 mortar shells (within 12 attacks).

**Clarification: The number of launchings is the number of rockets/mortar shells actually launched during one high-trajectory fire attack. For example: one attack may include a salvo of three launchings, that is, three rockets/ mortar shells, and so it will be counted as one attack and three launchings.

16 June 2016

Shabak: Monthly Summary – May 2016

Source: http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/Reports/Pages/ReportE090616.aspx



Monthly Summary – May 2016
May's terrorist attacks did not result in any fatalities, but injured 12 Israelis – 4 civilians and 8 security personnel: 5 were injured instabbing attacks (the 4 civilians in Jerusalem and one soldier in Tel Aviv); 3 security personnel were injured in a ramming attack near Beitunia/Ramallah (Judea), 2 in IED attacks in Hizma (north-east of Jerusalem) and Isawiya (northern Jerusalem), and 2 as a result offirebomb attacks in Isawiya.

As in April, May saw no Jewish terrorist attacks.

Data regarding terror attacks in May 2016
Following is a regional distribution of attacks:  16 attack from the Gaza Strip, (3 in April); 67 attacks in the Judea and Samaria (75 in April); 17attacks in Jerusalem (35 in April); 1 within the "Green Line" (2 in April).

Jerusalem and the Judea and Samaria area: Most attacks executed inMay 65 out of 84 were in the form of firebombs (April: 91 out of 110).


Distribution of attacks according to regions and pattern profile:

Following is a distribution of attacks in May 2016 according to regions:

The Gaza Strip – 16 attacks: 2 rocket launchings; 12 mortar shell launchings; 2 small arms shooting.

Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem – 84 attacks: 11 IED (including pipe bombs and improvised grenade) (1 in Jerusalem); 4 small arms shooting; 3 stabbing (in Jerusalem); 1 run over; 65 firebombs (13 in Jerusalem).

The "Green Line" – one stabbing attack in Tel Aviv.


High-trajectory launchings from Gaza Strip and Sinai


Throughout May 2016 three rockets were launched** from the Gaza Strip towards Israel (within 2 attacks) and 19 mortar shells (within 12 attacks), as opposed to April in which no rockets or mortar shells were launched.


**Clarification: The number of launchings is the number of rockets/mortar shells actually launched during one high-trajectory fire attack. For example: one attack may include a salvo of three launchings, that is, three rockets/ mortar shells, and so it will be counted as one attack and three launchings.


26 February 2016

The Shin Bet: Monthly Summary – January 2016

Source:  http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/Reports/Pages/ReportE010216.aspx



Monthly Summary – January 2016

January 2016 saw a continued decrease in the number of attacks: 169 (136 in the form of firebombs), as opposed to 246 in December 2015. The decrease was evident in all regions. 126 attacks occurred in Judea and Samaria, compared to December's 194 attacks. 39 attacks took place in Jerusalem, as opposed to 43 in December and one attack within the Green Line, compared to two in December. The number of attacks originating in the Gaza Strip: 3, compared to December's 7.
 
Five Israelis were killed in January in terrorist attacks and 28 (18 civilians and 10 security forces personnel) were injured. 1 January's major shooting attack on Dizengoff St. in Tel Aviv killed two civilians and injured 7. Another casualty, related to this attack, is a taxi driver who picked up the attacker near the scene of the attack, and was later killed by him.

Additionally, two Israeli civilians were killed in stabbing attacks: one woman in Otniel, near Hebron, on 17 January, and another in Beit Horon, near Jerusalem, on 25 January.

Among the non-fatal casualties, 14 were wounded in shooting attacks- 7 in the aforementioned attack in Tel Aviv, 1 in Samaria and 6 in Judea.8 were stabbed – 3 in Jerusalem, 1 in Samaria and 4 in Judea, and 6 were wounded by firebombs in Jerusalem and the surrounding area (3 civilians and 3 security forces personnel).
Jewish terrorism – a carwash in Petah Tikva, employing Arab workers, was set on fire on 18 January.

Data regarding terror attacks in January 2016

Following is a regional distribution of attacks:  3 attack from the Gaza Strip, (7 in December); 126 attacks in the Judea and Samaria (194 in Dec.); 39 attacks in Jerusalem (43 in December); 1 within the "Green Line" (2 in December).

Jerusalem and the Judea and Samaria area: Most attacks executed inJanuary 136 out of 165 were in the form of firebombs (Dec: 181 outof 237). 



Distribution of attacks according to regions and pattern profile:

Following is a distribution of attacks in January 2016 according to regions:

The Gaza Strip – 3 attacks:  2 rocket launchings; 1 IED.

Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem – 165 attacks: 8 small arms shooting; 12 IED (including pipe bombs and improvised grenade); 9 stabbing (4 in Jerusalem); 136 firebombs (35 in Jerusalem).

The "Green Line" – 1   attack: shooting attack in Tel Aviv.


High-trajectory launchings from Gaza Strip and Sinai
  
Throughout January 2016 seven rockets were launched** from the Gaza Strip towards Israel (within 2 attacks), as opposed to one in December 2015.


**Clarification: The number of launchings is the number of rockets/mortar shells actually launched during one high-trajectory fire attack. For example: one attack may include a salvo of three launchings, that is, three rockets/ mortar shells, and so it will be counted as one attack and three launchings.



20 December 2015

Yuval Diskin: ++ נגד ההסתה והכפשת השב"כ החוקר את החשודים בטרור היהודי++


Google translation to English follows original post

Source:  https://www.facebook.com/yuval.diskin.9/posts/1956366174588062?pnref=story



++ נגד ההסתה והכפשת השב"כ החוקר את החשודים בטרור היהודי++
אני מכיר היטב את הלובי של הרבנים וחברי כנסת הקמים להגנתם של חשודים כמחבלים יהודים או פועלים לחנינתם של מחבלים יהודים שנשפטו ונכלאו.
חלקם אף מנסים לשכנע כי אנשים אלו יוכלו לשמש דוגמא ולחנך אחרים שלא לפעול בדרך הטרור... מעניין שאינם ממליצים על מחנכים דומים מקרב מחבלים שפוטים פלסטינים...
אני מכיר היטב גם את הגופים השונים העוסקים בהדרכת פעילי ימין קיצוני, אנשי תג מחיר ונוער הגבעות לעמידה בחקירות שב"כ.
השב"כ משקיע מאמצים כבירים על מנת לאסוף מודיעין על הטרור היהודי בהצלחה רבה יחסית, ומתקשה מאז ומתמיד בחקירות הטרור היהודי משום הקושי הרב להשיג ראיות ברמה הנדרשת בדין הישראלי.
משימת החטיבה היהודית ואגף החקירות של השב"כ היא משימה קשה מאין כמוה ובמיוחד באווירה הציבורית המתלהמת ומול מערכת ההסתה וההסברה שהתגייסה להכפשת השב"כ.
כולי תקווה שהשב"כ יצליח במשימה הקשה והמורכבת של חשיפת מבצעי הפיגוע המתועב בדומא והבאתם לדין.
אני גם מקווה שאם וכאשר יובאו חשודים לדין - לא יסתבר לנו שוב כי "אינם כשירים" להעמדה לדין משום שהם סובלים מבעיה נפשית כלשהי שאינה מאפשרת את הכנסתם לכלא....
אני מחזק את ידיהם של אנשי השב"כ העוסקים במלאכה החשובה כל כך של עקירת סרטן הטרור היהודי מתוכנו, ואת ידי ראש השב"כ יורם כהן הנמצא תחת מתקפה ישירה.
אין זו הפעם הראשונה שמפעילים לחץ על אנשי שב"כ הגרים בסביבה דתית. יש מקרים של אנשי שב"כ שעזבו את מקום מגוריהם או שנשארו וסבלו מאוד כתוצאה מיחס עוין של הסביבה מבלי שקיבלו כמעט גיבוי משכניהם.
מקווה שהדרג הפוליטי כמו גם רבנים ואנשי ציבור מהמגזר הדתי-לאומי "ישברו שתיקה", ויתגייסו לעמוד לצידו של השב"כ והעומד בראשו ברגעים קריטים אלו. "אם תרצו" לא תהיה זו אגדה....




Google translation:

++ Against incitement and defamation investigating the Shin Bet Jewish terror suspects ++
I know well the lobby of the rabbis and Knesset members who rise to the defense of Jews suspected terrorists or terrorist act Lhnintm Jews who were tried and imprisoned.
Some even try to convince these people that they could serve as an example and educate others that act of terrorism ... are not interested educators recommend similar among Palestinians convicted terrorists ...
I am well acquainted with the various bodies that deal led by far-right activists, members of the price-tag and the hilltop youth meeting the Shin Bet interrogations.
ISA invests enormous efforts to gather intelligence on Jewish terrorism relatively successfully, and has difficulty has always been Jewish terrorism investigations since the difficulty level of evidence required to obtain Israeli law.
Jewish brigade's mission and the Investigations Division of the GSS is the most difficult task, especially public atmosphere in front of a belligerent and incitement and propaganda which sought to besmirch the ISA.
I hope that the GSS succeeds difficult and complex task of exposing the despicable perpetrators and bringing them to justice Duma.
I also hope that if and when the suspects will be brought to justice - not that again we find that "not eligible" for prosecution because they suffer from any mental problem that does not allow to put them away ....
I wish to encourage members of the Shabak people involved is so important in cancer uprooting of Jewish terrorism from our midst, and by Yoram Cohen, head of the Shin Bet, which is under direct attack.
This is not the first time put pressure on the GSS men who live in a religious environment. There are cases of GSS agents who left their homes or stayed and suffered greatly as a result of hostile treatment environment without having received nearly a backup of their neighbors.
Hope the political echelon as well as rabbis and public figures from the religious-nationalist "break silence", and will mobilize stand by ISA and its leader these critical moments. "If you will" not be a legend ....

11 October 2015

Prevent the next big explosion by Yuval Diskin - 01 November 2013

Source: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4447641,00.html

Prevent the next big explosion

Op-ed: To prevent a 'Palestinian spring' Israel must create hope, and prisoner release is part of that
Yuval Diskin
Published: 11.01.13, 12:00 / Israel Opinion

The Arab Spring did not bring, as of yet, stability to any country in which it occured, but it did bring forth a new gospel that's impossible to ignore – the gospel of "The democracy of the masses, and not necessarily of the majority." Mideast nations suddenly realized their strength and their ability to cause coups and change regimes. The public realized that if there's a critical mass of displeased people – even if they are not, by definition, a majority – the regime will struggle to rule.


Even a brief scan of the situation makes it clear that all conditions are there for a Palestinian mass to rise up. Enormous tensions and frustration are building up within Palestinians who feel their land is being taken away from them, who see new settlements built every day, and who realize that the state they so wish for is moving away. They can't even take much solace in the economy anymore. Feelings of oppression and discrimination intensify as rage sets off over the incessant abuse of Price Taggers and their accomplices.

But in my experience, the most dangerous of all is the ever spreading impression among Palestinians that "there is no future, only a past." The past has nothing good in it, and the future – surely the shared one – no longer exists.

Deep social change is a slow process, which takes place throughout many years and under the radar of Intel and research elements. These have always had a hard time spotting them in time and mainly comprehending what the consequences will be for a generation of Palestinians that was "replaced" (70% of Palestinian population is under 35 years old), a generation that sees the Arab Spring storming in the Middle East, that recognizes the weakness of its own regime, who feels the personal consequences of an economy suffocating under the occupation. This is a generation with a very high percentage of university graduates, but with a rampant percentage of unemployment. Thus, hundreds of thousands of more-or-less educated youth, who grew up under the Israeli occupation, bitter, enraged, frustrated and mainly hopeless, are seeking for a target to be unleashed upon – and it's easy to guess what that target will be.

We mustn't forget that Israeli society itself contains complicated tensions between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority – Christian or Muslim – and those tensions can easily feed on what is happening and will happen between us and the Palestinians. Past experience has proven that Israeli Arabs show solidarity with their Palestinian brethren; as they have in October of 2000, in the vast protests during Operation Cast Lead, in incidents at Temple Mount, etc. Therefore, we must take into account this affinity.

All these make up gas fumes in ever rising density – until they reach a level where it will take only spark for them to explode.

Getting out of hand

Such a spark can be a car accident (the trigger for the first Intifada in December, 1987), a Jewish terror attack against Arabs, a rally dispersal gone wrong due to some inexperienced soldiers; maybe even a spreading rumor that won't be refuted quickly enough.

Palestinians or Israeli Arabs taking to the streets en masse is a completely likely scenario and not at all extreme. It has happened before here and in the last two-three years in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Turkey, and Iran. Therefore, we must assume it can happen here, as well.

It is in the nature of such events to get out of hand. Even Marwan Barghouti, who was the main instigator of the events that eventually led to the Second Intifada, did not plan in advance that taking to the streets in September, 2000 will turn into an intifada lasting years, with suicide bombings and thousands dead and tens of thousands wounded on the Palestinian and the Israeli sides. He planned for a few days, or weeks, of protests; but the sequence of events, the responses to incidents and the responses to the responses, has driven the situation out of control and deteriorated into a wave of terror which raged for nearly seven years.

Near the point of no return


Can we exit this one way street leading to an infinite conflict? First, a few basic premises are needed for focus.

The two states for two nations strategy is the leading Israeli strategy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I'm a staunch supporter of this strategy, but I believe we are very near the point of no-return from which the implementation of this strategy will be impossible.


The majority of the conflict's essential problems are centered in the West Bank and in Jerusalem.

The most complicated issues are: Territorial solutions, the right of return, the Jerusalem issue - mainly Temple Mount and the Holy Basin - and the eastern border, the Jordan Valley.

The split in the Palestinian Authority between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip is a critical problem hindering the ability to negotiate and reach a full and final agreement.

The current political map in Israel does not allow for an implementation of an agreement with the Palestinians.

The lack of trust between leaders will make reaching an agreement (such as former agreements) very difficult.

The public atmosphere on both sides is not conducive to building, let alone applying, an agreement.

Any agreement must include a sustainable and long-standing solution of the security issue.

And finally, a question relating to all these points: What would make an agreement effective over time?

Interests to strengthen the agreement

Since the issues on the table are intricate and difficult to solve, our first aim must be peaceful coexistence that will create the infrastructure for a long-lasting, powerful peace. This coexistence must be set on a solid ground of common interests, shared by several circles of "interested parties."

These interested parties are countries that even in the age of the Arab Spring and the Iranian threat have the most significant interest in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Turkey, and of course, the US, the EU, Russia and other countries. These interested parties contain several circles that can strengthen one another and stabilize the agreement over time.

The first immediate circle must include those who have the largest interest in a lasting agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, as they will reap the most benefit from it: Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan, and Egypt. Involving Jordan and Egypt deep into the negotiations early on is pivotal to the success and future of any agreement that will eventually be reached. Egypt and Jordan's deep involvement will also provide Abbas with an infrastructure of Arab legitimacy which so matters for him to make crucial decisions.

In order to turn these countries into real, interested parties, during the talks a tapestry must be carefully woven out of the parties' common interests: Security, energy, water, transportation, economy and agriculture. This tapestry, translated into a series of long-term agreements between the players of the first circle, can create a healthy codependency among them all. Israel, who has strategic access to gas, water desalination, and advanced agricultural technologies, can be a central and influential player on each of those aspects.

The second circle should include Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the Gulf states, which have the financial and diplomatic abilities to support an agreement and aid in its stability. The third circle should include the US, Russia, Europe and other countries that have a clear interest in settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They must create positive incentives, both diplomatic and financial, to all involved parties to reach an agreement.


Only the weaving of a tapestry of shared interests turned into regional agreements can ensure the survival of the future peace deal and the sides' commitment to it over time. Furthermore, a deep commitment stemming from a deep partnership of Jordan and Syria in the agreement, with clear gains for each country, can promise that both countries will leverage their interests vis-a-vis a future Palestinian state, thus guaranteeing its lasting commitment to any signed agreement.

This commitment is based on the dependency of each country on the other for its existence and its stability as a country, as unhinging this stability can affect neighboring countries as well.

Since the issue of the split between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is unsolvable in the near future, and since the most critical problems exist in the West Bank, such a settlement must begin in the West Bank through a series of significant, trust building moves right away, that will help create a solution-conductive atmosphere.

This is how to create hope


How can such a process be started when the distrust on both sides is so profound? We must create hope. We must dissolve the Israeli and Palestinian public's sensation that there's only past, and make them believe there is also a future. Much like an economy in crisis, the very existence of hope may grease the wheels and aid a process of growth and coming out of the crisis. How can it be done?

First, we must firmly believe in the way and mean it with out very hearts, first of all those we chose to lead us who declare their support of the two states solution.

Second, in order to send a clear message that our leaders do mean peace, we must create a dramatic change in the Israeli political map, which means setting up a new coalition of parties supportive of a peace agreement. The coalitional political map as it currently exists means there is no chance to lead a move towards peace in the Israeli public.

Third, building personal trust between the leaders, as all diplomatic processes between us and the Arabs were built on trust created between our leaders or their representatives.

Fourth, pursuing negotiations as secretly as possible with minimum leaks until an actual outline is formed.

Fifth, changing the atmosphere by leaders on both sides by addressing and talking to the
Israeli and Palestinian societies.

Sixth, to extend generous gestures in order to strengthen hope and trust in the public that something is indeed changing. Two gestures can contribute greatly to strengthening hope:

The first and most important one is the immediate freeze of all settlement construction anywhere outside of the main settlement blocks.
The second is prisoners' release. Despite my absolute disapproval of releasing prisoners under blackmail for kidnapping soldiers or civilians, I support releasing prisoners as a government gesture to promote a peace process. A gesture such as this, due it its huge sensitivity in Israeli society, must happen at an optimal time and in a way that will maximize its goals.

Seventh – at the right time – making bold moves by Israeli leadership, such as appearing in Ramallah in front of a forum of senior Palestinian officials, or inviting Abbas to address the Knesset – in order to promote peace.


Eighth, VIABILITY FOR LAND. This is the negotiation formula whose purpose is on the one hand to allow for a sustainable Palestinian state and on the other hand to narrow down territorial exchanges as much as possible. Such assets can be, for example: A port or access to sea, partnership in desalination or water supply facilities, committing to provide electricity and gas, starting joint industrial areas to promote economy, and creating jobs.


I believe only the combination of brave leadership, strategic thinking, expectation coordination, creating hope, thinking outside the box and public dialogue on both sides, may lead to a turn that will veer us off the lane which leads us almost inevitably to the next conflageration.
 


The Mosaic Institute: Ami Ayalon - The Gatekeeper - 01 March 2013

via the Mosaic Institute:

In the late winter of 2013, with the aim of fostering dialogue between and among Canadians of Jewish and Arab background, the Mosaic Institute brought retired Israeli Admiral Ami Ayalon to Toronto for a program centred around the then-imminent release of the Oscar®-nominated documentary film The Gatekeepers. From 1996 to 2000, Admiral Ayalon had directed the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency, and he and several other former directors of that organization are prominently featured in the film. Over breakfast on March 1, Ayalon spoke to a small group of community leaders and friends of the Institute at the National Club in downtown Toronto. This podcast features highlights from Admiral Ayalon's remarks that morning. The narrator is John Monahan, Executive Director of the Mosaic Institute.

 

13 September 2015

The Shin Bet: Monthly Summary – August 2015

Source: http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/Pages/ReportE100915.aspx

Monthly Summary – August 2015
5 Israeli citizens were slightly injured in stabbings. One civilian and one member of the security forces were stabbed on Route 443 on 9 and 15 August, respectively. Two members of the security forces were stabbed in Samaria on 15 and 17 August, and another officer was stabbed at Jerusalem's Lions' Gate on 26 August.
Three soldiers were injured (two seriously and one slightly) in a vehicle attack near Sinjil, Ramallah on 6 August. Another soldier was moderately injured by a pipe bomb thrown at an IDF post in Beit Jala on 19 August.
One civilian was slightly injured by gunfire at a passing vehicle near Kedumim on 30 August. Two other civilians were moderately and slightly injured by a Molotov cocktail thrown at a vehicle near Beit Hanina, north of Jerusalem, on 3 August.


Data regarding terror attacks in August 2015
Following is a regional distribution of attacks:  3 attack from the Gaza Strip, (1 in July); 117 attacks in the Judea and Samaria (63 in July); 51 attacks in Jerusalem (42 in July).


Jerusalem and the Judea and Samaria area: Most attacks executed in August 136 out of 168 were in the form of firebombs (July: 90 out of 105). 


Distribution of attacks according to regions and pattern profile:


Following is a distribution of attacks in August 2015 according to regions:

The Gaza Strip – 3 attack: rockets launching.

Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem – 117 attacks:  5 stabbing; 1 vehicular run-over attack; 4 small arms shooting; 22 IED (including pipe bombs and improvised grenade);  136 firebombs (50 in Jerusalem).


High-trajectory launchings from Gaza Strip and Sinai


Throughout August 2015 3 rockets were launched** from the Gaza Strip towards Israel as opposed to July: 2 rockets one from the Gaza Strip and one from Sinai.


**Clarification: The number of launchings is the number of rockets/mortar shells actually launched during one high-trajectory fire attack. For example: one attack may include a salvo of three launchings, that is, three rockets/ mortar shells, and so it will be counted as one attack and three launchings.

                              

21 June 2015

Israel Security Agency: Monthly summary - May 2015

Source: http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/Reports/Pages/Report110615.aspx


Monthly summary – May 2015
May 2015 saw an increase in the number of attacks, compared to April: 152, as opposed to 121. The increase was most evident in Jerusalem, with 60 attacks, as opposed to 38 in April. 91 attacks took place in May in Judea and Samaria, compared to 82 in April. One attack involving rocket fire was registered in the Gaza Strip, similarly to the April statistic.
 9 Israeli citizens (6 civilians and 3 members of the security forces) were injured in terrorist attacks in May. 6 of them suffered injuries in vehicle attacks, and 3 were stabbed in Judea and Jerusalem.
Vehicle attacks: one police officer was slightly injured in Hebron on 9 May; 3 civilians were injured (one moderately and 2 slightly) at Alon Shvut Junction on 14 May; and 2 police officers were slightly injured in Abu Tor, Jerusalem on 20 May.
Stabbings: one civilian was slightly injured in Mishor Adumim on 11 May, and 2 civilians were slightly injured at Jerusalem's Damascus Gate on 24 May.
Data regarding terror attacks in May 2015
Following is a regional distribution of attacks:  1 attack from the Gaza Strip, (as in April); 91 attacks in the Judea and Samaria (82 in April); 60 attacks in Jerusalem (38 in April).

Jerusalem and the Judea and Samaria area: Most attacks executed in February 129 out of 151 were in the form of firebombs (April: 108 out of 120). 



Distribution of attacks according to regions and pattern profile:

Following is a distribution of attacks in May 2015 according to regions:

The Gaza Strip – 1 attack: rocket launching.

Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem – 151 attacks: 2 run-over (1 in Jerusalem); 2 stabbing (1 in Jerusalem); 2 small arms shooting; 16 IED (including pipe bombs and improvised grenade);  129 firebombs (58 in Jerusalem).



High-trajectory launchings from Gaza Strip and Sinai


Throughout May 2015 one rocket was launched** from the Gaza Strip towards Israel, as in April.


**Clarification: The number of launchings is the number of rockets/mortar shells actually launched during one high-trajectory fire attack. For example: one attack may include a salvo of three launchings, that is, three rockets/ mortar shells, and so it will be counted as one attack and three launchings.

Monthly summary – May 2015.pdf

17 May 2015

Shin Bet: April 2015 Report

Source: http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/Reports/Pages/Report052015.aspx

Monthly summary – April 2015
April 2015 saw an increase in the number of attacks, compared to March: 121, as opposed to 89. The increase was evident in all regions, and especially Judea and Samaria, with 82 attacks in April, compared to 58 in March. 38 attacks took place in Jerusalem in April, as opposed to 31 in March. One attack involving rocket fire was registered in the Gaza Strip in April after a period of zero attacks in January, February, and March
 An Israeli civilian was killed and another seriously injured in a vehicle attack at Jerusalem's French Hill on 15 April. Eight members of the security forces were injured in several stabbings and vehicle attacks. Four police officers were injured (two moderately and the other two slightly) in a vehicle attack near A-Tor in Jerusalem on 25 April. Three IDF soldiers and a border police officer were injured in stabbings: one IDF soldier was slightly wounded at the Trans-Samaria Checkpoint on 2 April; two soldiers were injured (one seriously and the other slightly) at Sinjil Checkpoint near Ramallah on 8 April; and a border police officer was moderately injured near the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron on 25 April.

Data regarding terror attacks in April 2015

Following is a regional distribution of attacks:  1 attack from the Gaza Strip, (0 in March); 82 attacks in the Judea and Samaria (58 in March); 38 attacks in Jerusalem (31 in March).

Jerusalem and the Judea and Samaria area: Most attacks executed in February 108 out of 120 were in the form of firebombs (March: 78 out of 89). 


Distribution of attacks according to regions and pattern profile:

Following is a distribution of attacks in April 2015 according to regions:

The Gaza Strip – 1 attack: rocket launching.

Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem – 120 attacks: 7 IED (including pipe bombs and improvised grenade); 2 run-over (in Jerusalem); 2 stabbing; 108 firebombs (36 in Jerusalem).


High-trajectory launchings from Gaza Strip and Sinai


Throughout April 2015 one rocket was launched** from the Gaza Strip towards Israel, while in March no rockets or mortar shells were launched from Gaza Strip or Sinai towards Israel.


**Clarification: The number of launchings is the number of rockets/mortar shells actually launched during one high-trajectory fire attack. For example: one attack may include a salvo of three launchings, that is, three rockets/ mortar shells, and so it will be counted as one attack and three launchings.

Monthly summary – April 2015.pdf

06 January 2015

Yuval Diskin's Facebook Timeline Tuesday, 06Jan2015

**פוסט זה נכתב כתמיכה במאבקם הצודק של תושבי "עוטף עזה" בערים, בקיבוצים ובמושבים, על מנת שעניינם ובעיקר ביטחונם האישי לא יירד מסדר היום**
מדוע לתושבי "עוטף עזה" סיבה טובה לא לסמוך על שיקול הדעת של צה"ל והממשלה כל זמן שהתשובות לשאלות העקרוניות והקשות שעולות סביב מלחמת "צוק איתן" לא הוצגו לציבור? ומה יש לבנימין נתניהו הכביכול "בטחוניסט" (??) לומר על כך? האם נפתלי בנט ואורי אריאל היו מקבלים בשקט כזה צמצום אבטחה על מתיישבים / מתנחלים בירושלים או ביהודה ושומרון? ומה עמדתו של אביגדור ליברמן "בעל החלומות" בתקופה האחרונה או שהוא עסוק מדי באש המלחכת של פרשיית החקירות ב"ישראל ביתנו" ? ואני גם שואל את אלו שמחוץ לממשלה - בוז'י וציפי ויאיר ושאול וזהבה וגם כחלון – היכן אתם בעניין הזה?
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בקיץ האחרון, לפני כארבעה חודשים בסך הכל, הייתה ממש כאן מלחמת "צוק איתן". מלחמה אותה לא תכננו, מלחמה אליה נגררנו ושיעדיה ככל הנראה נקבעו בחופזה ממש ברגע האחרון. מלחמה בה נפלו 72 חללים, רובם הגדול חיילים, מטובי בנינו, שנלחמו באומץ לב במסירות רבה ובנחישות מרשימה ביותר אולם ככל הנראה לא עם מיטב האמצעים, על מנת להרוס את מערך עשרות מנהרות התקיפה שנחפרו מרצועת עזה לשטח מדינת ישראל.
&&&&&
ברור שלא הייתה הפתעה מודיעינית בסיסית בסוגיית מנהרות התקיפה. אני יכול לקבוע בוודאות ממעורבות אישית עמוקה עד מאי 2011 מועד פרישתי מהשב"כ (ואשמח מאוד כפי שכבר הצהרתי בעבר לכל בדיקה יסודית, אובייקטיבית ומעמיקה של הטיפול בנושא בעשור האחרון) שהיה מודיעין רב ואיכותי בשב"כ, בפד"מ ובאמ"ן (גם אם לא מלא) שנאסף לאורך שנים רבות על מנהרות התקיפה וכי הנושא זכה בשל חומרתו הרבה לטיפול מיוחד ועדיפות עליונה. חיפוש קצר בגוגל יציף קישורים רבים לדיווחים שנמסרו במהלך 8 השנים האחרונות לוועדת החוץ והביטחון, בתדרוכים לעיתונאים וכמובן בישיבות ממשלה על המנהרות שנחפרות מרצועת עזה לשטח מדינת ישראל לצורך ביצוע פיגועים. קבוצות עבודה מודיעיניות ומבצעיות עסקו בשב"כ, בפיקוד הדרום ובאמ"ן באיסוף המידע, בניתוחו ובהערכתו עקב ההבנה העמוקה ששררה במערכת באשר לאיום החמור הנשקף מהמנהרות ההתקפיות.
&&&&&
ולמי שלא זוכר, אחת הסיבות העיקריות להידרדרות אחרי תקופת "התהדיאה" (ההרגעה) של 2008 שהובילה למבצע "עופרת יצוקה" הייתה התעקשות של שב"כ ופד"מ לטפל במנהרה התקפית כזו שנחפרה לכיוון נחל עוז כחודש וחצי לפני היציאה (היזומה) למבצע "עופרת יצוקה". דרך אגב - באותו המבצע, הבית הממולכד ממנו נחפרה המנהרה פוצץ על כוח צה"ל שהגיע למקום למזלנו ללא נפגעים.
גם לאחר "עופרת יצוקה" (ינואר 2009) נמשך האיסוף המודיעיני על המנהרות ואף ביתר שאת. היה ברור כי החמא"ס מרכז מאמץ יוצא דופן בתחום זה ולכן הנושא קיבל עדיפות גבוהה מאוד הן בשב"כ והן בפיקוד הדרום ובאמ"ן.
&&&&&
שאלות עקרוניות שטרם נענו:
• בסוף שנת 2012 , כשנה וחצי לפני מבצע "צוק איתן" יצאה מדינת ישראל למבצע "עמוד ענן" ולצורך זה אף בוצע גיוס גדול של מילואים. אין ספק שהתמונה המודיעינית של איום המנהרות ההתקפיות על חומרתה הייתה ברורה לחלוטין לכולם. האם ייתכן שקונצפט "הטילים יחלידו" המיוחס ליעלון כרמטכ"ל מול חזבאללה, היכה שורש שוב בתקופת נתניהו, ברק ויעלון גם בהקשר המנהרות ההתקפיות מהרצועה? מדוע אם כן לא דובר על איום המנהרות והצורך לטפל בו במהלך ההכנות ל"עמוד ענן"? מדוע לא בוצעה כניסה קרקעית לרצועה כבר אז לצורך טיפול במנהרות למרות שהמילואים גויסו ובהיקף נרחב מאוד?
• אין ספק כי המודיעין הזה הוצג לנתניהו לשר הביטחון שלו ברק בתקופת ממשלת נתניהו של 2009 ולשר הביטחון יעלון בתקופת הממשלה האחרונה. נתניהו אף טען שמינה את היועץ לביטחון לאומי דאז עמידרור לרכז את הטיפול בעניין המנהרות. עמידרור עצמו אישר זאת בכלי התקשורת ואף אמר בכנות כי לא נעשה הרבה בעניין הזה. האם מדובר בכשל של הדרג המדיני שלא נתן לכך עדיפות? או שמא הדרג הביטחוני (צה"ל ושב"כ) לא הציף את משמעויות המודיעין שברשותו בנושא זה כנדרש לראש הממשלה, שר הביטחון והקבינט?
• חודש וחצי לפני "צוק איתן" התקבלה החלטה תמוהה ביותר לצמצם את תקני רכזי הביטחון השוטף ביישובי העוטף. כיצד אם כן התקבלה החלטה כזו באם איום המנהרות ההתקפיות היה ברור לכולם? מניסיוני, דווקא החלטה כביכול שולית זו, יכולה להעיד בסבירות גבוהה על כשל חמור בהערכת המצב ובתחושה הכללית ששררה במערכת הביטחון באותה העת בנשא המנהרות.
• האם ייתכן שראשי המערכת המודיעינית והביטחונית (בעיקר הרמטכ"ל ראש אמ"ן וראש השב"כ) לא דפקו ערב "עמוד ענן" ואף לא ערב "צוק איתן" על דלתם ועל שולחנם של שר הביטחון וראש הממשלה בעניין זה?
• כיצד נתניהו ויעלון היו מוכנים להפסקת אש לפני שהתחיל המבצע הקרקעי, על אף המידע הרב על המנהרות ההתקפיות שנחפרו לשטחנו ועל אף שהייתה התרעה ברורה (ועל כך להבנתי אין וויכוח בין שב"כ לאמ"ן) על הפיגוע האסטרטגי באמצעות מנהרה באזור כרם שלום?
&&&&&
טבען של מלחמות ומבצעים שהן חושפות תקלות אולם חמור מכך הוא אי מיצוי התחקירים ויישום הלקחים הנדרשים. אני משוכנע כי צה"ל ושב"כ ערכו תחקירים רבים אולם גם הדרג המדיני חייב דין וחשבון לנו - לציבור על התנהלותו, הובלתו והחלטותיו במהלך "צוק איתן" סביבן יש סימני שאלה רבים.
כמו לרבים אחרים, יש לי הרבה יותר מתחושה שהדרג המדיני מנסה לטאטא את התשובות לשאלות אלו ולנוספות הקשורות ל"צוק איתן" אל מתחת לשטיח. חלק מהשאלות הללו מצביעות על אפשרות לליקויים חמורים ועל שיקול דעת בעייתי בקבלת החלטות.
בהיעדר תשובות לשאלות חשובות אלו, לתושבי "עוטף עזה" סיבות לגיטימיות מאוד שלא להאמין לנתניהו ולהמשיך במאבקם הצודק כנגד ההחלטה על הוצאת החיילים מהישובים הנמצאים מעל לקילומטר מהגדר ועל כך שעניינם לא יוסר מסדר היום.
דווקא היום בתקופת בחירות, עלינו לדרוש מנבחרינו ובעיקר מאלו המתהדרים ב"ביטחוניותם" (??) וב"ידם החזקה" (??) דין וחשבון בעניין זה.
* * This post written in support of the just struggle of "support" in the cities, kibbutzim and moshavim, to their business and personal safety doesn't order today * * why people "support" good reason not to rely on the discretion of the IDF and the Government each time that the answers to the questions of principle that arise around them "Cliff" war not displayed to the public? What is Benjamin Netanyahu on alleged "thonist" (--) to say about it? Is Naftali Bennett and URI Ariel would quietly like reducing security for pilgrims/settlers in Jerusalem or Judea and Samaria? And Avigdor Lieberman's position a "dream" recently or is too busy in the fucking rug-Muncher of the ב"ישראל our affair"? And I also ask those outside Government disdain and Tzipi and Saul and Yair and gilding as well as window – where are you on this?
& & & & & Last summer four months ago, overall, was right there with "Cliff" war. It's no war plan, war and its trailing her apparently hastily scheduled notice. A war in which fell the big spaces, 72 soldiers, of our sons, who fought bravely with devotion and determination impressive but apparently not with the means to destroy the dozens of tunnels excavated attack from Gaza to Israel territory.
& & & & Obviously & was a basic intelligence regarding the tunnels. I can determine with certainty from deep personal involvement until May 2011 until retirement from the back (and I would be very happy as we have maintained in the past for a thorough, objective, and thorough treatment on the subject in the last decade) was a high-quality intelligence on the seat pad and an (albeit incomplete) collected over many years about the tunnels and that the seriousness of the issue was due to a lot of special care and priority. A brief search on Google would flood many links to reports delivered during the last 8 years the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, in a briefing for journalists and Government meetings on the nachprot tunnels from Gaza into Israel territory to carry out attacks. Intelligence and working groups dealing with the operational seat, southern command and intelligence in data collection, analysis and assessment on the deep understanding of the system with regard to the serious threat posed to the tunnels the intent.
& & & & And whoever & remember, one of the main reasons for the decline after "tahdiya" (the calm) of 2008 that led to operation cast lead was the insistence of States and fed to handle such offensive tunnel dug towards the Nahal Oz 6 weeks before departure (initiated) operation cast lead. By the way, in the same operation, so our House was excavated from the tunnel blasting on IDF force arrived fortunately without casualties.
Even after cast lead (January 2009) the intelligence gathering about the tunnels and more. It was clear that Hamas is an extraordinary effort in this area and therefore it was a very high priority on both the ISA and the southern command and EM.
& & & & Questions & fundamental unanswered: • at the end of 2012, a year and a half before operation Cliff Miller "left the State of Israel for" pillar "and it has a large reserve recruitment. There is no doubt that the intelligence picture of the intent of threat severity was clear to everyone. Is it possible that the concept "rust" which refers to a Chief of staff Ya'alon against Hezbollah, struck again during the Netanyahu, Barak and Ya'alon also in the context of the intent of Gaza? Why not speak of the tunnels and the need to deal with during the preparation to cloud "? Why not login to strip ground already for dealing with tunnels although there were recruited and very widespread?

• There is no doubt that this intelligence was presented to Netanyahu and his Defense Minister Barak during the Netanyahu Government of 2009 and Defense Minister Ya'alon during the last Government. Netanyahu also claimed the unique national security adviser at the time to the treatment center amidror into the tunnels. Amidror himself confirmed it in the media and say honestly that we don't do much about that. Whether the failure of the political echelon that gave it a priority? Or perhaps the security Echelon (IDF and SLA) haven't flooded the meanings their intelligence on this subject as required to the Prime Minister, Defense Minister and the Cabinet?

• One and a half months before Cliff Miller "the decision puzzling to reduce the current security standards in the wrapping. How, then, the decision was made that if the threat of the intent was obvious to everyone? In my experience, the so-called marginal decision that could indicate a likely major failure in evaluating the situation and feel the security system at the same time in a tunnel.

• Is it possible that the intelligence chief and heads of intelligence and security system (especially the head Chief and head of the GSS gave) no knocking. "pillar" or "evening" with cliff on door and tables of the Defense Minister and Prime Minister on this matter?

• How Netanyahu and Yaalon were ready for a ceasefire before starting the operation, notwithstanding the vast information on the intent to prefer ... excavated and although there was a clear warning (and thus to understand and debate between you and em) about strategic bombing through a tunnel near the Kerem Shalom crossing?
& & & & Nature of wars & and they reveal problems but even worse is the extraction of lessons and investigations required. I am convinced that the IDF conducted many investigations and in but also the political echelon have our accountability to the public on its shipments, and his decisions during "rock solid" have many question marks around them.
Like many others, I have a feeling that the political Echelon is trying to sweep the answers to these questions and other ל"צוק them" under the carpet. Some of these questions point to serious impairments option and problematic judgment in decision making.
In the absence of answers to questions that are important to residents of "support" very legitimate reasons not to believe to Netanyahu and to continue the struggle against the decision on the removal of the settlements are soldiers per mile over the fence and that their cases will not be removed from the agenda.
Today during an election, we must demand that the nbachrino and the ב"ביטחוניותם" ATM withdrawals (??) and retention "(what?) and accountability in this regard.

A moderate Israeli leader visits the LSE | openDemocracy 16 March 2010


A moderate Israeli leader visits the LSE 

In the audience of a London School of Economics panel chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi to discuss the findings of the Goldstone Report and peace in the Middle East, a Palestinian student ponders the contribution of Admiral Ami Ayalon
Under unusual security arrangements with a high level of anxiety at the LSE, the panel assembled on March 8, 2010 before a packed audience of several hundred people. Organized by LSE Global Governance and chaired by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, this panel brought together former head of Israel's internal security service, Shin Bet, and Knesset member Admiral Ami Ayalon; two members of the Goldstone fact-finding mission, Professor Christine Chinkin and Colonel Desmond Travers; and Karma Nabulsi, Director of the Civitas project at Oxford University and a former PLO representative.
Christine Chinkin gave a brief presentation on the mandate and methodology of the Goldstone report and Desmond Travers followed with a detailed explanation of the legality and effectiveness of the use of certain weapons in the Gaza war.  Ami Ayalon took the podium announcing, 'War is horrible. There is no ideal war'. With such a promising introductory statement, I assumed that the speaker, billed as a 'moderate' leader, would argue for a better world based on justice and peace.  However, a frightening prospect for the future of any peace process was soon opened up when he set about declaring that international law cannot bring peace, that meetings and diplomacy should come later, and that there is no need to look for justice.  Can such views be dubbed 'moderate' and issue from an Israeli leader who, claiming to be a peace-keeper, launched the People's Voice Peace Initiative jointly with Professor Sari Nusseibeh? Surely this raises many more questions than it answers: not least, what hope is there for peace?
Before coming to London, Admiral Ayalon had declared, 'I would not go to London to debate the Goldstone Report, which I think is one-sided and incorrect. I am coming to debate the Goldstone Report and the peace process. Goldstone is written in the language of blame. I believe the only way to respond is with the language of responsibility, and the dictionary of the future'. In his speech at the LSE, Ayalon repeated his position against the mandate of the panel, stating,'…we can't discuss peace and the Goldstone report in the same panel, because they are two different cultures and atmospheres. To discuss the Goldstone report, we have to bring legal experts and international law and civil rights experts here. But those people can't create peace. Those people use the language of guilt and blame. This is all they know. They only deal with past events. We need to jump to the future. We even need to imagine that we have peace and then go backwards from there. We need to have a different dictionary, a dictionary of responsibility. We should not look for justice: we only need to look for fairness and honesty'. Such arguments were swiftly countered by the other panellists. Chinkin replied that, without question, one of the core functions of law is to allocate responsibility, while Nabulsi argued that international law is central to bringing peace; the crisis continues precisely because international law is being ignored, while the actors instead rely upon naked power. She concluded by saying, 'I strongly recommend you use a different way'.
In his ten minute talk, Admiral Ayalon expressed his various views in a disjointed, contradictory manner, jumping from one topic to another and making sure to emphasize the oft-repeated 'danger' of Hamas and Islamic fundamentalism. In the end, he said very little on the Goldstone report. Perhaps a former commander-in-chief of the Navy may have been expected to be out of his depth. He said as much himself, '…for me, I know nothing about international law. But I was in the battlefield for the last 40 years. I know Hamas and Muslim fundamentalists. I met terror everywhere.  I was against the war on Gaza, I did my best to stop it, not because we don't have the right to defend our people, but because I know Hamas' strategy, and it is not a secret to know Hamas strategy.  Just go to their website and it is written there in Arabic, English, and Hebrew. They have a clear strategy, which is to draw the Israeli army into the populated areas - where, simply, they can use their people as shields. And because of that Israel failed in allowing the killing of civilian Palestinians to take place'. He continued his arguably irrelevant presentation by arguing that Israel has to use power to defend itself. But that also, in order to defeat Hamas, Israel has to create a peace process. As evidence for this, he cited one of the last speeches of the Hamas leader, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who had admitted to being, 'afraid that Palestinians will believe that freedom and the end of occupation can be achieved by using diplomacy.' Yassin, Ayalon concluded, feared a political process, since it is estimated such a process could shrink support of the Palestinian population for Hamas by as much as 18%. However, the problem remains a profound communication gap. Palestinians need only freedom, a better life and economy. The majority of Palestinians and Israelis want peace: however, 'they believe that the other side doesn't believe in peace'.
Maybe it is not surprising that a former head of Shin Bet spent most of his time talking about Hamas rather than the panel topic. However, while he accused and blamed international law experts for being 'prisoners of the past', the admiral fell into the same trap. No doubt hoping that the ten minutes would end soon while the audience waited for him to discuss the Goldstone report, Ayalon began a story about a previous occasion in 2002 when the LSE invited some Israelis and Palestinians to search for better solutions to the conflict raging at that time. One of the Palestinians he had met and befriended told him, " 'Ami, finally we won!' So I asked, 'Are you crazy?' He replied, 'You don't understand us. All we want is to see you dying, to see you suffering, and finally now we have achieved a balance of power'". Ayalon claimed that this had so frustrated him that it inspired him to meet with Professor Sari Nusseibeh and to launch their joint peace initiative. He said '…we did that because we believe that what was missing during all previous negotiations is a clear vision of the future, before talking about Jerusalem, refugees, settlers, and security. However painful it is, we have argued for a two-state solution - Israel as a Jewish democratic state and a Palestinian state. This means that we have to give up the settlements ideas and all settlers should be outside the West Bank. We have to pass the law of return of settlers, and at least, I think, 30% would return to Israel and this will be a precondition for an improved atmosphere. On the other hand, the Palestinians also have to give up the dream of the return of refugees'.
How many from the audience, I wondered, bought into this prescription for the future? Admiral Ayalon concluded his speech by asserting that the Palestinians needed to create unity – 'until that happens, Israel will not be able to deal with a situation with two Palestinian governments'. He didn't forget to repeat his formula that 'there will be no peace by using power, but also international law is not the solution too'. And finally, in an attempt to satisfy the audience's need to hear some discussion on the Goldstone Report, he said, 'we have to investigate independently. I don't want Goldstone to tell me what to do: we know.'
When asked directly by Lakhdar Brahimi why Israel had refused to cooperate with Goldstone's fact-finding mission, Admiral Ayalon replied robustly, 'I don't know. I think that the Government of Israel had the impression that the report was written before the nomination of the committee'. Brahimi interjected here, 'no, it is not at all fair to say that'. This rescued the Admiral from blundering on in the presence of two members of the committee whom he had just accused of making up the report's findings. Here, the Admiral surely reflected the conspiracy-ridden environment of his Shin-Bet past. As he had noted earlier in his speech, 'People in the region believe in conspiracy theories, and this is the main problem of the region, they believe that all is against them'.
There was one surprise, however, when the Admiral confessed that the Israelis missed a golden opportunity offered by the Arab leaders eight years ago in their peace initiative: 'We made a mistake when we didn't listen to the voices that announced the Arab Peace Initiative. We don't sufficiently understand the change in the Arab world reflected in the altered relationship between Khartoum and Beirut'.
In this brief report back, I have not addressed the important and relevant issues raised by the other excellent panelists. I have confined myself to relating in some detail the presentation made by an Israeli leader who claims that he is pro-peace. Sadly enough, this evening only confirmed that for him as well, Israel is above all of the rules that govern this world, and that international law is binding to all nations but Israel. It was shocking to hear a 'pro-peace' Israeli leader say that there is no need to look for justice! If the Admiral had some spare time, it would be good if he read what Professor Sen has written regarding 'the idea of justice'. Maybe the meaning of 'pro-peace' has already been given its alternative meaning in those 'responsibility dictionaries'.

About the author
Alaa Tartir is a Palestinian PhD candidate in Development Studies and Global Governance at the London School of Economics, researching the role of good governance in state formation in Palestine. His research areas include international aid and development, non-governmental organizations, public policies, and politics. He is also a research fellow at the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute-MAS.