Some Examples of Discussions on Defining Gender in the UK and Canada via Social Media

22 March 2019 - London, UK

26 Oct 2016 - Ontario, Canada
 

The Valuation of Victims and Targets in Defining a Crime and Terrorism: Canada, Israel and UK with Initial Examples From Orlando Shooting and Chicago Gangs

In Canada: TSAS Grants!! Major Research Grants and Studentships!! & March TSAS Workshop

Source: mass emailing

December 15, 2016   TSAS Grant and Studentship Deadline Fast Approaching!!! TSAS Major Research Grants  (Up to $20,000/year for 2 years) &   Studentships Grants ($5000-PhD & $3000-MA for field work or to subsidize travel to the TSAS Summer Academy)  Deadline for both applications: 11:59pm, January 10, 2019. New Researchers we ask that you apply for TSAS affiliation by Dec 15, 2018.    For details see TSAS website.  ____ Save the Date:   TSAS Workshop - March 7, 2019 Hosted at Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada Please join us on March 7, 2019 for the TSAS Spring Research Workshop. The workshop will showcase recently completed research by TSAS affiliates, and offer an opportunity to observe and participate in high-level discussions between researchers and policy makers on a variety of topics relevant to terrorism, security, and society in Canada. We will be using a new format for this workshop! 1) 7-9 Speakers offering intensive,  5-8 minute long, "Thesis-style"  presentations  2) Fish Bowl style conversations in which the presenters would be matched with a couple of reps for our government partners to have a high level conversation about the given subtopic in a breakout format.  3) A return to the larger group to share results of the discussion.   Please stay tuned to our upcoming events pages for registration information.

TSAS
67 Erb St W, Suite 206
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Canada

What does it mean to be Canadian? — Outburst

The Fruit Machine: Canada's Cold War gay purge

Advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment.

The National: Federal government grants extension to MMIWG inquiry

Remarks by FINTRAC’s Director and Chief Executive Officer / Allocution prononcée par directrice et présidente-directrice générale de CANAFE

Source: mass emailing

Remarks by FINTRAC's Director and Chief Executive Officer

(La version française suit.)

FINTRAC's Director and Chief Executive Officer, Nada Semaan, delivered opening remarks at the House of Commons Finance Committee on May 24, 2018.

http://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/new-neuf/ps-pa/2018-05-28-eng.asp

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FINTRAC is an independent federal government agency with a mandate to collect, analyze, assess and, where appropriate, disclose information in order to assist in the detection, prevention and deterrence of money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities.

Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada
24th floor, 234 Laurier Avenue West, Ottawa, Canada K1P 1H7

Government of Canada

Follow us on Twitter : @FINTRAC_Canada

---------------------------

Allocution prononcée par directrice et présidente-directrice générale de CANAFE

La directrice et présidente-directrice générale de CANAFE, Nada Semaan, a prononcé des observations préliminaires devant le Comité des finances de la Chambre des communes le 24 mai 2018.

http://www.canafe-fintrac.gc.ca/new-neuf/ps-pa/2018-05-28-fra.asp

Pour retirer votre nom de la liste, veuillez transmettre un message à List-liste@canafe-fintrac.gc.ca en indiquant uniquement « Désabonnement » (sans guillemets) comme objet du message.

CANAFE est un organisme fédéral indépendant, chargé de recueillir, d'analyser, d'évaluer et, le cas échéant, de communiquer des renseignements pouvant être utiles à la détection, à la prévention et à la dissuasion du recyclage des produits de la criminalité et du financement des activités terroristes.

Centre d'analyse des opérations et déclarations financières du Canada
234, avenue Laurier Ouest, 24e étage, Ottawa, Canada K1P 1H7
Gouvernement du Canada

Suivez-nous sur Twitter : @CANAFE_Canada

Online Consultation on Countering Radicalization to Violence // Consultation en ligne sur la lutte contre la radicalisation menant à la violence

Source: mass emailing

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: CRF / FRC (PS/SP) <ps.crf-frc.sp@canada.ca>
Date: 2018-04-26 13:49 GMT-05:00
Subject: RE: Online Consultation on Countering Radicalization to Violence // Consultation en ligne sur la lutte contre la radicalisation menant à la violence
To: "CRF / FRC (PS/SP)" <ps.crf-frc.sp@canada.ca>

(La version française suit le texte anglais.)

Hello,

Please note that the consultation on countering radicalization to violence has been extended by one week, and will close on May 3, 3018.

If you have not had the chance to complete the consultation, please take a moment to share your ideas through the consultation portal. Please also feel free to share this information with your partners where relevant.

Thank you,

Community Resilience Fund Team

******

Bonjour,

Veuillez noter que la consultation en ligne sur la lutte contre la radicalisation menant à la violence a été prolongée par une semaine. La nouvelle date de clôture sera le 3 mai 2018.

Si vous n'avez pas eu la chance de compléter la consultation, veuillez prendre quelques instants pour exprimer votre point de vue à l'aide du portail de consultation. N'hésitez pas à transmettre la présente information à vos partenaires, le cas échéant.

Merci,

Équipe du Fonds pour la résilience communautaire

From: CRF / FRC (PS/SP)
Sent: Thursday, April 05, 2018 2:32 PM
To: CRF / FRC (PS/SP)
Subject: Online Consultation on Countering Radicalization to Violence // Consultation en ligne sur la lutte contre la radicalisation menant à la violence

French version to follow / La version française suit

Hello,

You are receiving this email because you are on the Community Resilience Fund mailing list.

Today, the Honourable Ralph Goodale, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, invited Canadians to share their thoughts on countering radicalization to violence through an online consultation session.

We want to hear from you. Please take a moment to share your ideas through the consultation portal, where submissions will be accepted until April 26, 2018.

Please also feel free to share this information with your partners where relevant. This consultation will help inform the development of Canada's national strategy on countering radicalization to violence and, as such, it is important that it reflects the local realities across our country.

Thank you,

Community Resilience Fund Team

***

Bonjour,

Vous recevez le présent courriel parce que vous êtes inscrit à la liste de distribution du Fonds pour la résilience communautaire.

Aujourd'hui, l'honorable Ralph Goodale, ministre de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile, a invité les Canadiens à faire connaître leur opinion au sujet de la lutte contre la radicalisation menant à la violence, à l'aide d'une séance de consultation en ligne.

Nous voulons connaître votre opinion. Veuillez prendre quelques instants pour exprimer votre point de vue à l'aide du portail de consultation, au plus tard le 26 avril 2018.

N'hésitez pas à transmettre la présente information à vos partenaires, le cas échéant. Vos commentaires aideront à orienter l'élaboration de la stratégie nationale du Canada en matière de lutte contre la radicalisation menant à la violence.  Il est donc important que cette stratégie reflète les réalités locales partout au pays.

Merci.

Équipe du Fonds pour la résilience communautaire

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CSIS Canada: Deborah Gunton

CSIS Canada‏Verified account @csiscanada Mar 8

(1/5) On #InternationalWomensDay, we pay tribute to our departed former colleague, Deborah Gunton – a trailblazer, mentor and much admired woman at CSIS who passed away in 2017. #MyFeminism #IWD2018

CSIS Canada‏Verified account @csiscanada Mar 8

(2/5) Deborah started her career with the @RCMPGRCPOLICE working in counter terrorism, moving to CSIS when it was formed in 1984. She was one of our organisation’s first investigators. #MyFeminism #IWD2018

CSIS Canada‏Verified account @csiscanada Mar 8

(3/5) Deborah was the first woman at CSIS to be posted overseas, overseeing numerous important and complicated files and operations. She represented CSIS at the highest levels of government and in far corners across the world. #MyFeminism #IWD2018

CSIS Canada‏Verified account @csiscanada Mar 8

(4/5) Most importantly, Deborah was an advocate and mentor for countless women in the intelligence field. She left an indelible mark on generations of women intelligence officers. #MyFeminism #IWD2018

CSIS Canada‏Verified account @csiscanada Mar 8

(5/5) Deborah Gunton’s legacy at CSIS is that of a trailblazing woman, rising through the ranks in a field then dominated by men, championing countless women to reach further and higher in their careers. Today, we honour that legacy. #MyFeminism #IWD2018

 

 

Results are in! CIJA's 2018 Grassroots Consultation

Source: mass emailing

From: Steve McDonald <info@cija.ca>
Date: 1 March 2018 at 15:50:19 GMT-6
Subject: Results are in! CIJA's 2018 Grassroots Consultation

Dear Debra V., As a member of our community, your priorities are our priorities. Our advocacy work will simply not succeed without a passionate, engaged, and active community to guide our efforts. That's why we recently hosted our annual grassroots consultation in twelve cities across the country. Our goal was to hear directly from our community about the issues that matter most. I'd like to personally thank you for your interest in our Winnipeg consultation. Your input – and that of community members across the country – is crucial in determining what CIJA's priorities will be for the coming year. Our work would not be possible without your valuable contribution. So, again, thank you! One of the biggest takeaways for me was a reminder of the energy, dedication, and thoughtfulness of our community. Despite a healthy diversity of opinion, a number of key themes emerged across the country. In no particular order, here are the top five: Building support for Israel and countering BDS and anti-Israel media bias Developing partnerships with other faith/ethnic communities on issues of common cause Fighting antisemitism and expanding Holocaust education Protecting our community and combating hate crimes Strengthening Jewish identity through education and supporting students on campus Click here to view the local results and see how your city compares nationally. It's clear we are united in our desire to ensure the next generation of Jewish Canadians has a secure future in this great country. In every city, we met passionate community members – like you – who shared opinions, offered observations, and provided us with insights that will guide our work in the coming year. If you have any suggestions that might improve future consultations, I'd love to hear from you. I hope to will join us again in 2019. Warm regards, Steve McDonald Director, Policy and Strategic Communications

The Judicialization of Bulk Powers for Intelligence Agencies

Source:

http://craigforcese.squarespace.com/national-security-law-blog/2018/2/26/the-judicialization-of-bulk-powers-for-intelligence-agencies.html

The Judicialization of Bulk Powers for Intelligence Agencies

Monday, February 26, 2018 At 11:48AM

Personal Speaking Notes (February 2018)

(posted publicly with permission)        

I have been asked to reflect on common trans-Atlantic intelligence dilemmas, and then a variation on our traditional trans-Atlantic search for solutions.  To that end, I’ll say a few words about both the UK Investigatory Powers Act and some of the proposed aspects of bill C-59. 

In some large measure, both the UK IPA (Investigatory Powers Act) and C-59 constitute what former CSIS director Jim Judd once called “the judicialization of intelligence”. Mr Judd raised concerns about this development.  Intelligence has traditionally operated in a manner obliquely governed by law, if at all. There is a disconnect between a covert intelligence function – and its requirements – and the more overt culture of law and lawyers and judges. Intelligence needs are fluid.  Law is rigid. Intelligence needs are immediate and exigent. Law can be laborious.

But law has inevitably encroached on intelligence. An academic colleague – Dennis Molinero – has uncovered a trove of documents from the 1950s.  At that time, these documents show, national security domestic intercept warrants were issued by Prime Minister Louis St Laurent as an exercise of discretionary power under something called the Emergency Powers Act. There was the vaguest of statutory imprimaturs, and certainly no independent judicial oversight in the form of preauthorization.

We abandoned that approach in 1974, and the original iteration of the what is now Part VI of the Criminal Code.  And in 1984, we built CSIS search and seizure around a judicial warrant process – and the next year, the Supreme Court decided Hunter v Southam. Since then, in cases like the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Atwal, through to Justice Crompton’s recent decision in the In the Matter of Islamist Terrorism case, the domestic intelligence search and seizure expectations have been placed on a constitutional footing largely indistinguishable from that of criminal law.

In the IPA, the UK has moved considerably closer to our model than had been the case before. Once the purview of ministers, executive warrantry is now supplemented by review by judicial commissioners.  The shorthand is: double-lock (executive approval of a warrant supplemented by judicial review, prior to execution).

But in Canada, we have yet to address two dilemmas also at issue in the IPA. Both fall in the realm of what in the UK context is called “bulk powers”.  And since in bill C-59 we moving in this area, and judicializing, it is on this topic I wish to focus a few remarks.

So first, let me define bulk powers: a bulk power is one that allows intelligence agencies access to a large quantity of data, most of which is not associated with existing targets of investigation. It is the mass access, in other words, to data from a population not itself suspected of threat-related activity. The commonplace example, since Snowden, is internet or telephony metadata for entire populations of communications users.  But bulk powers can also involve content, and not just the metadata surrounding that content.

Bulk powers are controversial – they are the heart of the post-Snowden preoccupations. They inevitably raise new questions around privacy, and in the Canadian context, Charter rights.  Not least: bulk powers are irreconcilable with the requirements of classic warrants. There is no specificity. By definition, bulk powers are not targeted; they are indiscriminate.

In the IPA context, the world of bulk powers can be divided into bulk interception; bulk equipment interference; bulk acquisition; and bulk personal datasets.  Of these, I want to focus on bulk interception and bulk personal datasets.

Bulk interception is what is sounds like: the collection of transiting communications passing through communications providers or otherwise through the ether. 

Canadian law permits bulk collection by the Communications Security Established, our signals intelligence service. It is subject to the caveat that acting under its foreign intelligence or cyber security mandate, CSE may not direct its activities at Canadians or persons in Canada. But in practice, bulk interception cannot be limited to foreigners, even if the objective is foreign intelligence. The way communications transit the internet and other communications systems creates a certainty that bulk intercept directed outside the country will intercept the communications of Canadians and persons in Canada.  This is known as incidental collection.

In Canada, we have struggled with this issue. Part of the answer is in Part VI Criminal Code. As you know, it outlaws unauthorized intercept of private communications. A private communication is one with at least one end in Canada. Since in bulk interception, at least some private communications would be captured in a manner meeting this definition of intercept in Part VI, CSE must be exempted from its reach.  And that is what the National Defence Act does, where CSE acquires a defence minister authorization in advance for at least the class of foreign intelligence or cybersecurity activities that might capture this private communication.

The constitutional issue is more fraught. Not least, the defence minister is not the independent judicial officer invoked as the gold standard under Hunter v Southam for Charter section 8.  The consequence has been the constitutional lawsuit brought against CSE by the BCCLA associations and now efforts at refinement in C-59.  And specifically, C-59 anticipates a quasi-judicial intelligence commissioner who will review the ministerial authorization before its execution. This past week, representatives of the CSE testifying before the Commons committee accepted the underlying constitutional expectation: They said under C-59, CSE will seek ministerial authorization (which in term triggers review by the intelligence commissioner) for any activity that would interfere with the reasonable expectation of privacy of a Canadian or a person in Canada, or contravene an Act of Parliament.

I am hoping that signals a willingness to amend the bill to say just that, on its face, but for our part my key point is this: C-59 clearly accepts the underlying premise: judicialization of bulk intelligence interception. In this respect, C-59 emulates the IPA.

But I wish to be clear, again: this is not a warrant. It will lack specificity. It will be issued for classes of activities, not specific activities or operations. It is review on reasonableness of a ministerial authorization, not the more hands-on warrant process. Does that meet Hunter’s standards?  I am inclined to suggest, yes, because the warrant cookie cutter cannot possibly apply to a form of bulk intercept in which intercept of s.8 rights-bearer communications is entirely incidental, and not targeted.

Before leaving CSE, I will say a word about another C-59 change.

We have also gone one step further than the IPA in giving CSE a specific offensive cyber mandate – called active cyber.  This could and almost certainly would implicate equipment interference, but interference untied to information acquisition and instead done “on or through the global information infrastructure to degrade, disrupt, influence, respond to or interfere with the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state, organization or terrorist group as they relate to international affairs, defence or security.” 

At present, there is considerable debate in Parliament about whether the intelligence commissioner should have advance oversight responsibilities in relation to this mandate.  Currently, he or she will not.  I am of two views on whether judicialization in this area would be wise or not.

Turning to domestic-facing bulk powers, I need to switch agencies and talk about CSIS.  And here we have drawn clear inspiration from the IPA in the area of bulk personal datasets.  The UK understanding of this expression is an apt descriptor of what is now also in play in Canada:

"A bulk personal dataset includes personal data relating to a number of individuals, and the nature of that set is such that the majority of individuals contained within it are not, and are unlikely to become, of interest to the intelligence services in the exercise of their statutory functions. Typically these datasets are very large, and of a size which means they cannot be processed manually."

Why have such things? The C-59 changes are a response, yes, to the Federal Court’s 2016 decision on what was known as ODAC.  But it also responds to a broader concern about the ambit of the Service’s threat investigation mandate. That mandate is anchored in s.12 of the CSIS Act. As interpreted by the courts, it permits the Service to collect, and analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada, to the extent strictly necessary.  As Justice Noel and Justice Crampton concluded in both the ODAC case and the more recent In the Matter of Islamist Terrorismdecision, this is a significant fetter on CSIS. It ties information collection, retention and analysis to a narrow band of threat investigations.  It also makes it difficult for CSIS to change the frequency of its fish radar and expand its reach to search other parts of the ocean for fish that have not already come to its attention.

A spy service fishing in more ocean is, in some eyes, the stuff of Big Brother and nightmares. On the other hand, an intelligence service that cannot have access to the ocean in performing its function is also likely unable to perform its functions very well.  And there is a lot of ocean out there in the digital era.  So how can we reconcile oceans full of data generated by innocents with the intelligence function of clearing the fog of uncertainty and revealing not just the known threats but also the unknown threats?

The solution in both the UK and Canadian context is to judicialize the fish detecting radar. And the model is again a double lock: ministerial approval for ingestion of datasets and judicial commissioner approval.

The result, in the Canadian context, is enormous complexity. Broadly speaking, there are a set of legislated rules in C-59 for the ingestion of datasets, and then a more demanding set of rules for the digestion. (I credit a Department of Justice lawyer for this ingestion/digestion analogy, which is quite apt).  So for Canadian datasets – datasets primarily comprising Canadian information – there is approval of classes of datasets that may be ingested by CSIS by both the minister and the quasi-judicial intelligence commissioner.  Once ingested, there is a limited vetting by CSIS.  And then any subsequent retention for actual use – that is digestion -- must be approved by the Federal Court, which is empowered to impose conditions on that subsequent use.  There is also a requirement that querying generally be done only where strictly necessary in performance of CSIS’s mandates.

I have included charts in the materials. (See also here).

Those charts show why some intelligence operators complain that C-59 is a gift to lawyers.  I suppose it is no surprise, then, that I think this is a clever regime.  Not least, it short circuits inevitable frontier s.8 issues; to wit, does s.8 attach to the big data analysis of information, the individual bits of which triggers no reasonable expectation of privacy. It seems almost certain that the jurisprudence will get there. C-59 heads this issue off at the pass by superimposing independent judicial authorization guiding and conditioning that big data analysis.

So, on that happy note, I shall end there.

Thank you.